

Chapter 4

*Ressentiment*² and Racism

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Introduction

First, it is very helpful to dispel some forms of false consciousness by beginning with an accurate demographic profile of both the Korean American and the African American communities. Conveniently, this is done for us in several other chapters in this volume and in various and sundry other sources. Having an accurate sense of these communities is important because there is plenty of evidence that both groups are suffering from false consciousness in that they hold beliefs about each other that are demonstrably false, such as; many if not most African Americans are poor and academic slackers and most Korean Americans are rich and super students. As a researcher, I cannot afford to suffer from such delusions if I hope to say anything meaningful about the situation. And in this sense, being not of either group may actually aid my attempt to assess the state of their inter-group communication.

Second, we need to dispel false beliefs about the U.S. context. When the great segregationist, Mahatma Gandhi, came to the United States, a reporter asked him what he thought of American culture. His famous response was that it would be a good idea. This response reveals two

shortcomings in the great man's thinking. First, in this comment he expressed a strange amnesia, forgetfulness about a debt owed concerning the fact that as a student of Western (specifically British) law at Cambridge, England and in Africa he had discovered Thoreau who inspired his own formulation of nonviolent resistance. Ironically, it was of course Thoreau and Emerson who were among the first to articulate an indigenous American philosophy, one that also greatly impressed Nietzsche by the way.² And secondly, Gandhi's statement indicates that he did not understand the American milieu.

The United States began as a colony and remains the largest colony on Earth. But at the same time it has presented to the world a model for revolution. Furthermore, as far as this writer is aware, the United States is the only nation in history where the dominant ethnic group (white Euro-Americans) fought a devastating internecine war within its own ranks in order to liberate a subordinate group. Certainly in so far as caste systems around the world (including in India) have been weakened it is somewhat the result of the democratizing influence of the Western, especially the United States, example.

The United States was the first modern colony to free itself from colonial domination, to become "post-colonial." The United States does not present even an illusion of being a single great culture, as that of the Victorian India of the Rajas, because its multicultural dynamics prevent the solidification of a single "identity," steeped in traditionalism as one finds in places like the India of Gandhi's Anglicized imagination and nation-building fervor, or modern China with its official state policy towards language, religion, and internal migration. Like so many other colonies, both India and the United States find within their artificial borders many cultures bound together by the legal status of modern citizenship rather than the more organic boundaries of tribal/ethnic group solidarity. Tribes are naturally occurring phenomena. Nation-states are legal, self-conscious inventions, which often encompass several different organic groups. To my post-colonial critics, we must be on guard against moralizing. What have been offered are facts that dispute moralizing. Besides, there is no meta-criteria, no rule that says that a colony cannot also be a colonizer. We are witnesses not to a "post-colonial" epoch but rather a time of hyper-colonialism (see Chapter 11). The unidirectional linearity, which identifies Aristotelians and confused post-colonial theorists alike, cannot explain the fact that although the United States is the greatest colony on Earth, it can at the same time be one of the greatest colonizers. Intercultural communication has a reversibility to it that can be

informed by the research of scholars like Emmanuel Levinas and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. This is why I have abandoned the ever-popular neo-Hegelian linear models of personal evolution to higher states of “maturity” qua “cultural adaptation,” with all its ethnocentric, Spencerian ramifications (nationalism promoted as a panacea by Everett Roger’s diffusion of innovations model and William Gudykunst and Young Yun Kim’s cultural adaptation model). Rather, an explanation of the omni-directionality and morphological properties of cultural dynamics I call cultural fusion is offered as an alternative (Kramer, 1998; see Chapter 11 in this volume)³

Time and the “Model Minority”

We need to confront the idea of “model minority.” In classic critical fashion it must be asked whose criteria are used for the notion of being a “model,” an exemplar or paragon of proper comportment. This is important because models no longer pretend to mimic what was, but instead to set the standard for what should be.

There are two kinds of models: mimetic models and virtual models. We must be wide-awake about the fact that the temporal valence of modeling has shifted, been reversed in the post-realist world. Models used to be renderings of actual things expressing the classical desire to referentially re-present or capture the essence of what is already perceived. These were mimetic models. Examples abound like the incarnate Christ figure, the mathematical “manifold,” philosophies of “truth,” and the model cars and airplanes children make as well as the idols mythological peoples erect in place of a “Real” deity. But as various religious prohibitions and Nietzsche have taught us (with Gyorgy Lukacs reminding us), realism is a genre of fiction. Realism is a fiction with ideological and rhetorical teeth. It has been very persuasive and continues to be in the Galilean sciences (to recall Edmund Husserl’s critique of mathematization and purposelessness in the Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology some 80 years ago).

Today modeling has no generic constraints and its power is magical in the most technical sense of the term (Gebser, 1985; Kramer, 1997). Today, we model what is not actual, but instead we project fantasy into the future and engineer it. In this sense both the diffusion of innovations and cultural adaptation “theories” constitute rhetoric of social engineering, not social science. They are prescriptions for how to bring about desired states of affairs that do not yet exist. The best way to predict the future is to make it.

Models now are pure expressivity of ideational desire, *ou topos* (utopia), which literally means “nowhere.”

Virtual models manifest what the future should be. They are positivistic and “progressive.” They promise to solve “problems.” But what counts as a “problem,” let alone a “solution,” is highly relativistic. Virtual models manifest virtues. Virtues are neither what the past in fact was, nor what the present is, but rather the formalization of idealistic desires.

By revisiting the Proto-Classical world of Orpheus, the world before duality, before the problem of mimesis could make sense, we can take on two issues at once. We can gain a contrasting position that will help to reveal more clearly the entire notion and project of modeling as well as the distinction between the master and slave moralities. The claim that if there is no truth there can be no liars marks the Socratic quest. For the pre-Socratics, the virtues: truth, justice, and beauty were embodied.

The “Noble” and the “Ignoble”

Lying, according to Nietzsche, was the diametric opposite of noble morality. The Classical Greek idea of nobility was simply to be truthful. Nietzsche notes that the ancient pagans called themselves “the truthful” (Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, First Essay, Section 5). It is Theognis, the Megarian poet of the Sixth Century B.C., to whom Nietzsche turns for essential insight into this attitude before the morality of guilt was born, before the sublimation of instinct and the hatred of life gave power to the most obsequious sophists

In Theognis, Nietzsche finds a new root word coined for those who are truthful, *esthlos*. *Esthlos* “signifies one who is, who possesses reality, who is actual, who is true; then, with a subjective turn, the true as the truthful: in this phase of conceptual transformation it becomes a slogan and catchword of the nobility and passes over entirely into the sense of ‘noble,’ as distinct from the lying common man” (Nietzsche, *GM*, First Essay, Section 5). But this is not the end of the story of “noble.” Nietzsche, ever the best of etymologists, follows the decline of nobility as it came to designate an inner-worldly soul become “ripe and sweet.” We can see not only Nietzsche’s profound influence on Sigmund Freud, but also an extension of Voltaire’s idea that the soul is a consequence of becoming “civilized.” “All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward – this is what I call the internalization of man: thus it was that man first developed what was later called his ‘soul’” (Nietzsche, *GM*, Second Essay, Section 16).

The soul was the result of sublimated instinct, of the emergence of shame and of hiding the vital demands of the body's organs. The soul is the unnatural or supernatural turning inward of life denying itself, becoming hostile and cruel to its possessor. It heralds the origin of "bad conscience" and the so-called ascetic virtues (Nietzsche, GM, Second Essay, Section 16). The world splits into two warring factions, the Titanic and global instincts versus the godly rule makers, the chaos and the order, the body and the mind (Kramer, 1997: 76-79). We need to go back before the war between the gods and the Titans to recall the Golden Age before the dissociative fracture between, and birth of "culture" as that which is not "nature."

The Urban Cradle of Cruelty

Lewis Mumford (1961) and Desmond Morris (1969) link the inability to follow natural proclivities such as mating aggression, because of domestication and "civil" constraints, to all sorts of abuses of one's self and others who are available to act as proxies for the actual desired targets of aggression like competing suitors, bosses, and dangerous enemies. With civil society comes legalisms and obligations that conflict with instinctual drives (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, On the Genealogy of Morals; Freud, Civilization and its Discontents) Mumford, and later Morris, note that only with urban self-domestication based on the mass organizing principles of "great" religions legitimating profound power disjunctions between mere mortal followers and imperial god-men; only with this absolute power distance does the human species come to revel in wonton cruelty, to abuse subordinates with utter disdain. The advent of what Morris (1969) calls the "super-superior" and the "super-subordinate," of god-men and slaves, absolute bliss and absolute torment, marks a power differential far greater than exists in the Mesolithic hamlet or among other primates. What is born is the experience of "taking delight in another's pain" (Morris, 1969: 75) The advent of the Neolithic town gave birth to the "stranger," that person who one sees regularly and behaves pretty much like everyone else, but who harbors values and beliefs that are different (Simmel, 1950). The stranger is easier to despise and mistreat than an in-group member is. But what if the slave is intimate; the one who washes your back, cooks your food, and raises your children? In this case, empire organizes an elaborate legitimization for establishing a hierarchy of castes. Given enough time, even the super-subordinates come to accept as "natural" and appropriate their lowly station in the cosmos, a condition

Hofstede and Bond (1984) call "high-power distance."

The institutionalization and celebration of ruthless (inescapable from birth) domination in the form of separate castes marks what Nietzsche would call the ascent of the ignoble, of civilization – empire (Morris, 1969). Pageantry, dress, wealth, and other accoutrements mark the difference between the super-superior and the super-subordinate, two groups that under certain conditions literally come to be seen as separate species. Entire castes of people become segregated and abused such as African slaves in the United States, Koreans in Japan, and the Jews in Europe (Myrdal, 1944; Kramer & Ikeda, 1997; Simmel, 1950). Boundaries, administrative and physical, are erected to discourage "mixing." Since super-subordinates may look and act like their oppressors, elaborate means of identification are instituted as in the operationalization of race by eugenicists (Kramer, 1997: 118; Kramer & Ikeda, 1997; Kramer & Johnson, 1997). Identity boundary maintenance becomes a major function in life.

For Nietzsche, cruelty is ignoble. It does not manifest noble strength, the pagan virtue which Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* called "magnificence." Instead, cruelty presupposes a lie, a deception. The deception, the lie is that the one I really want to clobber I dare not because he is too strong and I fear an honest confrontation with him. So to him, I am sickeningly deferent, falsely humble and pleasant. This is what Nietzsche means by the "sweet soul." Then I turn to the weak and abuse them with impunity. This is what Morris (1969) calls displaced aggression due to a status struggle that is obstructed by domesticating prohibitions. One cannot, by definition, be cruel to an equal or a superior. Instead, an honest assault on the strong manifests courage and daring. One may defeat an equal or superior, but cruelty presupposes a subordinate target. The more weak and defenseless the target, the more cruel and ignoble the aggression.

Envy and *Ressentiment*

Those filled with envy of, rather than admiration for the strong become incubators of *ressentiment*. *Ressentiment* breeds cruelty. Christian morality, as Max Scheler (1919), Nietzsche, Max Weber (1930), and others have noted, has a nasty tendency to teach submission and also to be "the flower of *ressentiment*." In his famous essay "[The role of] *Ressentiment* in the Construction of Moralities," Scheler says, "... Christian values are particularly prone to being reinterpreted into values of *ressentiment* and have also been understood that way particularly often,

but that the core of Christian ethics did not grow on the soil of *ressentiment*. Yet we also believe that the core of bourgeois morality, which since the thirteenth century has begun more and more to supersede Christian morality until it attained its supreme achievement in the French Revolution, does have its roots in *ressentiment*" (Scheler, 1919:49).

Envy and anger can fester until its bitter poison bursts forth like puss unto those nearest at hand, those convenient for rage including the self. Morris (1969) has noted that a caged animal that cannot reach its tormentors through the bars will in a fit of frustration, bite itself. In the case of domesticated humans, it is not bars but often cowardice that prevents them from acting out aggressive impulses. Medieval inquisitors avoided the truly powerful. They dared not take on strong nobles, highly ranked church members or clergy. The artistic spirit of Michelangelo by contrast expressed itself by depicting just such persons as having been cast into Hell in his Sistine Chapel mural. Similarly, Beethoven was known to rail at royal patrons that "there are many princes but only one Beethoven." The inquisitors, in their fear and shame, became debauched. They tormented the weak, who were under their charge and worshipped those above them. And they even claimed status and pride, if not unvarnished delight, in and for their grizzly deeds. This is why common women (as opposed to queens or princesses) are so often the targets of displaced aggression. The weak cannot strike back with the fury of an honest and equal adversary. The ignoble have no respect for their enemies. There is no honor in burning a "bewitching" cat or vivisectioning a retarded child. This is not the act of a warrior spirit.

History as Excuse

With the soul is born time, anxiety, and the surrender of responsibility to the invention of tradition. Blind duty is the child of imperial order. Under such conditions history becomes cosmic "spirit." History, including origin mythology, is the first grand ideology, legitimator of the present, the inexorable thread of yesteryear winding its causal path to the now (Foucault, 1970). Written rationalization was initiated first in Judaism and later it was reiterated in George Hegel and Karl Marx as the teleology of "iron necessity" marching through evolutionary "phases" to a "final solution." "It is written" becomes the mantra of the super-stubborn, the inception of contractual relations between humanity and the cosmic spirit. Being Jewish, Jacques Derrida's (1973; 1981) claim that writing comes before speech, that speech is "*archi-e'criture*" (arch writing or arch-

phenomenon of memory) is understandable, although it remains a far-fetched attempt to rationalize rationalization. Later still history was formulated as the logical necessity of Charles Darwin's sense of natural selection, subsequently reduced by John Holland (1995) to being one giant algorithm, similar to what Richard Dawkins (1996) has called the "blind watchmaker." All that has changed is that Galileo's divine engineer, who presumably wrote the book of nature in pure mathematics, has become deminded, an automata without purpose. The universe has become reason without rhyme (mind), a self-organizing dissipative system (Prigogine & Stenger, 1984)

Nature has become pure logic in the form of a decision tree, but without a meaningful or semantic dimension to its linear if...then... structure. Only rules and meta-rules without purpose remain. And they are to be applied blindly as if each individual were a standard unit, identical in all ways like the ping-pong balls or electrical pulses of random number generation. This, Nietzsche and others have seen as the worship of the mass, the "mean" or base-line human, rather than concentrating on the "free spirits" that make a difference, that create a future; a future recognizable as such only in so far as it is different from the way things are now. Nietzsche focused on those prehistorians who make history, rather than those who fatally surrender to it.

With the triumph of historical traditionalism the open horizon of free will is lost, and with it, responsibility and unbridled ekstasis. Facts become justifications (Kramer, 1993). Consciousness is lost and humans become automata. Enemies become "traditional enemies" so that conflicts become permanent, with a life of their own that supercedes the real lives of real people, like the conflicts in the Middle East, Rwanda, East Timor, Northern Ireland, and south-central Los Angeles. Children are taught to presume that certain group members are "natural" enemies automatically deserving of suspicion and hate. It is no accident that such blind hatred exists at the boundaries where religions and ethnic types meet, the hot zones of civilizational plate tectonics where the "in" and the "out" of group membership is established.

When the weight of fatalistic history writing came to be felt, The (written) Word, so came the decline of the vital Greek sense of unexpected tragedy. A cloud of cowardliness fell over the orphic mystery, daring and responsibility were surrendered, and urban prudence gained favor. This pathetic surrendering of the self, even self-annihilation (holy suicide); this uninhibited begging for pity, mercy, and forgiveness, an attitude imported from the Orient into the Greco-Roman world, comes to over-ripeness in

the Christian and later Muslim admonition to "give your life to god," "put your salvation in His hands," "abandon yourself to Him," to be "reborn," which presumes the death of this life first. Gods become royalty and vice versa. Divine decree becomes law: "god's will" The search for saviors commences and continues into every "new age" and "new world" obsession with escapist salvation

Saved from what? One's own desires The self must be disciplined according to some "universal law" or other, the programming of prohibition. All asceticism leads to the fragmentation of the psyche whereby a person becomes criminal, judge and executioner in one. Hence, Freud's id, ego, and superego. Asceticism preaches the illusion of this life and the need to "let go" of it in order to escape it. This is a cowardly abdication very different from the prehistoric beliefs that have no unrealistic, dissociated expectations. Among them are the Orphic cults, Shinto, and Tibetan Bon. Such "primeval articulations" have had not only the strength to persevere but to even give birth to whole civilizations like Hinduism and Judaism; the spoiled children of tough, realistic, parents. There are no such dissociated abstractions, no such contradictions as "virginal birth" for prehistoric cults. For them, the temple "whore" is the most sacred person (Mickunas, 1994). The archaic and magical worlds shamelessly revolve around the two magical fluids: blood and semen (Gebser, 1985). "Identity" is bound with fertility and "group membership." That abstraction "identity," as a discrete individual, let alone "identity crisis," is unthinkable in the magical world. Magical people have not yet been "cast out" of the timeless realm of Eden into the purgatory of time and its fragmentary quality (past, present, future) which enables continual lose.

The decline into moralizing and guilt, self-conscious vanity (beauty and aging) and deception, is articulated in the war between the Titans and their corrupt "off-spring" (abstractions) the gods (Kramer, 1997: 76-77). As Joseph Campbell (1988) notes, organized religion promotes "credo over libido," programming and automation (dogma) over life (p.187). Such blind trust, such fatalism was alien to the pagans. It manifests a drive toward "corrections," "systematization," "order," and "conformity." For imperialists, "adaptability" became the highest "good." It is no mere coincidence that the Benedictine "Order" invented the mechanical clock, the cruelest of all taskmasters that synchronizes the entire world to its dead (mindless) imperative (Mumford, 1934). Under such conditions, to merely survive overtakes human (creative) living. The sword and the cross have marched together over countless civilizations.

Noble Odysseus

The story of the lost Odysseus articulates the glory of discovery and adventure and the perseverance of heroic determination in the face of the unknown. By stark contrast, the urban mob, the "herd," tears down the unique and memorizes rules and chants slogans that assure certainty and peaceful dogmatic slumber. Everything becomes contractual, even the social bond. This attitude is born in theology: "It is written." When Odysseus returns to the predictable world of domesticity, there he finds his worst adversaries, those sheep-men who would not dare to take what is his in his presence but only in his absence. And the Classical punishment for such liars and cowards was the justified wrath of the hero's bow that shoots strong, straight, and true, a bow of truth that the sheep-men had not the strength to even pull, let alone aim.

By contrast, the greatest tragic story of Classical Greece is the death of Socrates. This event marks the beginning of the end, the decline of the spirit of Periclean Athens following the conviction and execution of Socrates by the mob. He who does not adapt is the free spirit who moves the world. The attitude of slave morality, the herd mentality, often brings such spirit to tragic end, like a pack of dogs bringing down a majestic and solitary Mountain Lion. But even in his or her premature demise, be it Jesus, Socrates, or Martin Luther King, the tragic end of the hero generates more meaning in this world than the complacent and conformist commoner who lives a hundred years.

Ecstasy and Tragedy

Like someone who, while singing in their car with total abandon and gusto, is suddenly embarrassed into silence for being seen, dissociation enables analytical reflection and self-consciousness. Historically it meant the end of pagan joy. Self-monitoring makes life clumsy, killing spontaneity, self-confidence, and grace. Divine surveillance is inescapable. Conscience is a tireless overseer. Hence the systematic feedback loop of cybernetics, internal espionage in the service of a system bending back upon itself, servicing itself; Hegelian narcissistic masturbation. The meek, seeking cool hiding places, worship equilibrium. Stupidly, even after the experience of the SS and the KGB, proponents of systems theory still do not see the consequences. This is the case with but one ironic exception.

The inventor of systems theory, Norbert Wiener (1948), who realized that cybernetics, might be a dangerous trap.

In Classical Greece we observe the advent of distanciation. It takes many forms including "theatrical distance," which creates audience as a mass, like a tumor that feeds vicariously off of the vital energies of the "actors." Everything is scripted for the sake of emotional manipulation. This new slave, the "audience" presents some reversibility for in turn it demands "performance." The ancient modern audience came to sit and watch rather than revel in undifferentiated rite. With the perspective of the amphitheater that lens of stone that focuses attention was born the individual ego, the Greek celebrity, and the "speaker" at center stage. A celebrity, a thespian or sophist, is not a hero. With the rise of sophistry, the brutally honest heroes faded with the waning passion of the blood lust and the retreat of the Titans into the mist of prehistory. It is telling that at the same moment that observers wonder where the heroes have gone, the masses come to idolize celebrity. With the ascendancy of quantity over quality, just being known, for whatever reason, becomes a life's goal. It amounts to the ego on steroids. Nietzsche would suggest that the heroes have lost their color, turned stone gray by the terrible Medusa of reductionism. They have faded into the twilight, or been bleached to uniform pallor by the bright lights of modernism, a kind of snow blindness from flash bulbs. Nothing shall remain unwrapped or in shadow. Shading gives way to one-dimensional starkness. However, the distinction between being a celebrity and being a hero is yet discernable as when a single person is both at once, especially when it involves sacrificing celebrity for heroic purposes as in the case of Paul Robeson. Heroes come out of "prehistory" to make history, to rupture the system and to disturb the dogmatic slumber of conformists who seek to avoid the least ripple that might approximate awareness. They are negativists, not positivists. This is why the nonconformist, heroic Buddha described himself as one who is "awake." Heroes ignore those who doggedly seek to escape the challenge of difference, for awareness emerges only from the tension of the Other. Heroes do not acquiesce. They do not fear of getting out of line. Creative impulse thrives on worthy, truly threatening, and rivalry, like that between Picasso and Matisse.

Ordination Unto Death

According to Nietzsche, one of the greatest ironies is that those individuals who inspired the great axial movements like Buddhism,

Christianity, and the Socratic way were heroic. The axial thinkers did not keep records, they did not write things down, and they did not hold grudges. What followed was not of their making. As he put it, the only Christian to have ever lived was Christ. The rest fervently, pathetically strive to erase themselves and become mere copies, absolute duplicates, and redundancies. They are members of what should rightfully be called the "Pauline" institution (Nietzsche, Daybreak, Section 153). The hypocrisy of the followers of axial thinkers is that they have sought to become nothing instead of something – merely countless passive reflections of the Christ "figure" (for instance); identical mirrors en masse. They have even been reproducing themselves for generations in utter guilt. With the decline of that moment named Periclean Athens, from which so much erupted, with the dying down of that frenzied creative spirit that embraced and defended difference, including democratic disputation and argumentation, came a new "good."

The new urban "good," that displaced the passion that had given birth to it, was called "disinterested humility." It took the form of the dissociated narrator, like the new style of truth telling: Aristotelian monologue. The narrator, who is not part of the drama per se, but who sees all and tells all, is the prototype for the modern dispassionate analyst (philosopher/scientist). Aristotle, who was denied the headship of Plato's Academy, also evinces the other extreme. His temperament was too selfish, too egocentric. Aristotle's dualistic mentality saw people of two sorts, the contemplative versus the "man of action." Being rejected at the Academy, he went off to produce the megalomaniac, who to this day is yet regarded as a monster in western and central Asia, Alexander the "great." Wherever he went he destroyed much more than he built. Aristotle's life work, a beast, was set loose on the world. That great empire builder embodied a new idea. An ideal idea without limits: world conquest. It was Aristotle, perhaps taking his cue from Plato's Republic, who inspired the ambition of world domination beginning with Alexander. A new tradition that was initiated was more Aristotelian than Socratic. The ideal of world domination lived on, fueling the imagination of total ambition from the post-republican Ceasars of Rome to the Czars of Russia, and the drive for a new world corporate order at the cusp of the twenty-first century. The Alexandrian push to consolidate the entire world under one ego (monoculture) corresponds to the consolidation of religious pantheons into a single godhead, the "king of kings." The difference between the barefoot Socrates and the world conquering Alexander is profound. What can be said for Alexander however is that he had a vision and that as tyrants go,

he openly learned perhaps more from those he conquered, than what he taught. It was the Egyptians that seduced him into believing he was a god, a temptation that infected the Greco-Roman world a second time with Cleopatra's beguilement of Julius Caesar and Mark Antony bringing to an end the ancient modernism of Republican Rome.

As Alexandrian bureaucratic ordination came to domesticate the world, the sound of Orpheus' flute faded ever deeper into the wild and receding forests. And there too the sprites, nymphs and muses sank into the Earth only to speak to the creative spirits of mad men and children. The world was broken into two, only much later to be expressed by Rene Descartes as truth and systematic method (Gadamer, 1975).

The flight into eternal principles marked the demise of free will as it became bound by universal necessary conditions. Embracing this new Platonic heaven, the weak could, like all good bureaucrats escape responsibility by surrendering to formalism, a cowardly and dishonest, in a word ignoble, form of faceless "life." Nobility is strong enough to forgive and forget. But the ignoble keep records. *Ressentiment* keeps score and waits for a chance to "get even." Even justice came to carry a scale. As Karl Popper argued, if it cannot be measured it does not exist, and language is merely a tool, an idea close to the hearts of all dualistic sophists. The idea of a book of judgement expresses the dream of a type of memory that is as unforgiving as total recall. It is the prototype for authoritarian administration. It is no mere accident that history writing should emerge as a specific genre at about the same time as Plato and Aristotle. Databases and accounting techniques form the core of empire (Mumford, 1964). By contrast Socrates refused to write anything down, and it is said that angels have no memories.

The emergent domination of eternal principles (the inflexibility of "natural" law) even shows in sculpture. The Greco-Roman mimetic effort was dedicated to the contingencies of actual faces and to a poignant celebration of fleeting youth and beauty (the Olympic and Heretic movements, which even superseded war, for instance). Greco-Roman realism, the mimetic model, gave way to highly stylized, dissociated and idealistic Thomistic images that receded back into the two-dimensional Romanesque wall.

When Nietzsche says that the honest person is, he means there is no duality, no dissociation. But with Plato the "real" is elsewhere, disembodied. Long before Descartes, Heraklitus and Plato mark the temporal fracture of the human psyche. First, the world is bifurcated between the mortal flesh and the eternal soul, the body and the mind, and

then the flesh is deemed an inferior contingency, even something to be ashamed of, and finally as mere illusion, not even real. Today many social scientists including so-called intercultural communication experts manifest this dualism by attacking local "parochial" culture (the only kind there is) in favor of universal human laws of motion. Humanity becomes doomed to being a temporal creature of random accident, an illusion, and an absolute zero in the face of eternal principle. This belief maintains even into the domain of "artificial intelligence" and evolution, as consciousness (time) is reduced to being an epiphenomenon of underlying computation. Humanity is doomed to imperfection and destined for self-loathing and ascetic penance. Original sin had to be invented to assure disembodied guilt and the complete pathos of the human condition.

Thus is born the vilest of all emotions, pity. Humanity cannot even hope to save itself. "Man" becomes a lover of death and a hater of the living flesh, an ignoble coward who denies the truth of life, his own life. Even "love" becomes entangled with pity so that humanity's only hope is "love." Hence, Nietzsche's disdain for "Christian love," and also Buddhist "nihilism" which states as its ultimate goal the end of suffering which means the end of embodied life in exchange for the bliss of final death, eternal slumber.

Overall, to Nietzsche this is an absurd condition. In the West, Plato's mysticism (for absolute transcendental law and totalitarian generalization are mystically born from the realm of "pure logic"), leads the march into self-deception and delusion, abandoning this life in favor of eternal memories of absolute perfection before birth, and heavenly bliss after death. Similarly, and especially since Galileo, Pythagorean mysticism (number is all) predominates. Only numerical "values" "count." Nietzsche notes that everything but life is valued.

In the word kakos, as in deilos (the plebeian in contradistinction to the agathos), cowardice is emphasized: this perhaps gives an indication in which direction one should seek the etymological origin of agathos, which is susceptible of several interpretations. The Latin malus (beside which is set melas) may designate the common man. (Nietzsche, GM, First Essay, Section 5)

The Administrative Hierarchy of Lies

Cowardice leads to hiding and deceit. Its rancid fruit is the obsequious façade, the smiling face that hides a rotten core of malice. Unjust power is the soil of this plant. The false smile is presented to the superordinate who

is actually detested, and who in turn presents a never-ending smile to his or her superiors forming the hierarchy of lies. All the way up the line, everyone is smiling at his or her superordinate's ass. Superordination is not the same as superiority. The machine is the model for the "organization man" (Mumford, 1964: 276-81). A superordinate has power *by virtue* of his or her place within a rule-governed virtual system, not on the basis of actual strength of body or mind. In the virtual world of imperial (urban bureaucratic) hierarchy, genuine superiority vanishes as the politically minded "organization man" envies rather than admires those of higher rank (Whyte, 1956).

It is ordained that the king's son shall ascend to the throne by Divine law, even if he is feeble of mind and body. In fact, the genuinely strong often become frustrated by the domestication of the "status struggle," and are defined as "criminals" and placed in prisons to receive conforming habits – "rehabilitation" (Morris, 1969). Millions of years of evolutionary aggression are suddenly deemed "evil." Rules, rather than valor come to determine rank, and so it is that many in "high places" are not deserving of admiration.

The new world order envisioned by Saint-Simon and Comte at the very inception of "positivism," meaning order without passion as the greatest good, is to be led by "expert systems," by a "new priesthood" of social engineers who promote adaptation as the path to enlightenment, satisfaction, and happiness. The system will be our salvation. Life is sacrificed for stable predictability. Here we have the new face of the politician and salesman, the face of eternal optimism (which is a contradiction in terms), like the ubiquitous but insincere smiles on television. This is the opposite of the ancient concept of nobility meaning one who is (genuine).

Such smiling masks articulate the authoritarian mentality as defined by Machivelli and Theodore W. Adorno (1973). The authoritarian demands obsequiousness from those below and willingly gives it to those above. This is the Janus effect (Koestler, 1967). Such an attitude is even called "being civil" and "professional" in the order of things. Stability and predictability are not discovered but maintained.

Nietzsche warns against becoming too civilized, too repressed, too domesticated because this leads to nihilism and mass conformity. Even honest malice and a sharpened sense of hate are lost (Nietzsche, GM, Second Essay, Section 14). Honest feelings are confused and retarded. This is why punishment in prison, generally speaking, "makes men hard and cold; it concentrates; it sharpens the feeling of alienation; it

strengthens the power to resist," a truism Nietzsche came to long before Alvin Toffler (Nietzsche, *GM*, Second Essay, Section 14). In Power Shift, Toffler notes that of the three forms of power; muscle, money, and mind, muscle manifests the lowest quality for it can only be used to punish, it is finite, and it generates resistance. Understandably, self-evidently, Toffler, the consummate corporate consultant and soothsayer, evaluates "quality" in terms of the ability to manipulate and get away with it: without causing resistance. What has been learned from Plato on, Nietzsche argues, is that knowledge is power, but it is a truncated form of knowing, it is rote (the phonetic resemblance to "wrote" is no mere coincidence) technique and instrumental. The ignoble power of hegemonic deception takes the form not only of spying, but also of sophistry. Its cunning is that it short-circuits the possibility of honest resistance by going to the essence of identity and reversing and confusing interests. The organization man gives priority to the "objective" system over the subjective contingencies of mere human "resources." Lawyers make the bad appear good. This is the manifestation of the two world system born with Plato and reborn as what Max Horkheimer and Adorno (1947) call the Dialectic of Enlightenment, whereby "the hands" (labor) are separated from the "the minds" (manipulators with "super-vision"); the contingent from the absolutely Real.

The human no longer is possessed of and by the real but is about it, below it, dissociated from it and forever inferior to it. Modern alienation is the tragedy of the lost ecstasy of being in the world, of Dasein, the being where awareness of Being happens (Heidegger, 1962). For the modern world is dead and empty, not full and alive. As far as one can see with microscopes and telescopes the universe is reduced to ninety-nine percent absolute vacuum and piles of dead atoms vibrating. Now, not only the Titans have been vanquished but so too the gods are no more. All that remains are syntax rules. There is no value or meaning. Even people become mere resource. Persons become, in the organization, "functions," a word borrowed from mathematics.

The world becomes phony out of being afraid to be honestly. It is here that action and mind part ways leading to the confused metaphysics of a man who cannot trust his own senses and ponders the possibility that his god is a liar, Descartes. What emerges is malice for that which is directly at hand, direct personal awareness. The subject and conscious meaning come to be seen as the common but ignorant sense of an old befuddled woman (the "grandmother syndrome" so-called by experts in artificial intelligence); the deranged that needs to be arranged, the disoriented

reoriented. Direct, personal, qua subjective knowledge loses all credibility and is exterminated in the interest of “pure” knowledge. This is suicide. This is the contradiction, the absurd celebration of life against itself. Thus is born the fabrication of knowing a “disinterested” “objective” world without perspective, where to take a stand is denigrated as nonsense. To take a stand, to have a perspective, is not only denigrated as “mere opinion,” but morally attacked as egocentrism, as if it were even possible for us to “look around our own corners” (Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, Book Five, Section 374). Instead, a dissociated and abstract “mean” is ascribed “the real.”

The Model Conformist

The attack on the value of the self is very effective for achieving conformity (See Chapter 11 on “cultural adaptation”). As Nietzsche notes, the ultimate and ludicrous aspiration for the “objective man” is to reduce himself to an instrument, a totally dispassionate “self-polishing mirror,” that merely sits and reflects whatever “comes along.” Then he “gently spreads himself out, so that not even the lightest footsteps and the fluttering of ghostly beings shall be lost on his surface and skin” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Part 6, Section 207). Thus, we have the self-transcending “selfless man,” who is “beyond good and evil,” beyond cultural (or any other kind of) perspective, forming a depersonalized space that circumscribes the “caput mortuum” of virtue (Nietzsche, *BGE*, Part 6, Section 207). On the other hand, through greed, he is also resolved to torture from nature’s bosom (to paraphrase Bacon) her “secrets.” For even nature has become “deceptive.”

The individual can no longer know anything but “distortion.” But how is “distortion” knowable without “immaculate perception” for comparison (Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Kramer, 1997)? Presumably, the meta-mind of systematic transpersonal method is the seat of true knowledge-power. Epistemological and moral attacks on the very awareness of a living subject are combined and called the “egocentric fallacy.” Identity, cultural, psychological, historical, and so forth, experiences a “crisis.” The bodily, sensual human becomes a shame. In so far as one hates fallibility, one is self-hating. Thus, one is guilty of being “wrong” epistemologically, and “wrong” morally. The strong individual is pulled back into the mass, blended away into a numerical average, which takes the place of conviction and courage – in a phrase, point-of-view. Hence the malice, the *ressentiment* of the strong by the weak and the “sickening” guilt of

“modern men” at the thought of the triumph of their own ancestors in the struggle for supremacy. Guilt, and being ashamed of victory, is the ultimate gloom of an ideology that preaches that the passive self-polishing mirrors should inherit the Earth, that “interests” are evil. This is the slave morality. They cannot defeat the strong directly so they attack with a new weapon they have invented, conscience.

For Nietzsche, to be “noble” is to be “pure of heart.” Such is the honest warrior who proceeds without self-deception. It is understood that “all-sides” are trying to win. Only weak losers claim that being weak, in and of itself, is an injustice. Others, who claim that all can be “winners,” are either naïve or liars. Losing is not an injustice. And winners need not feel ashamed at victory. Nobles are undeniably and unashamedly strong. The relativism of strength is simply a fact of life. By contrast, deceptive gloom shrouds the poisonous sweet talk from impotent self-haters, the priestly classes of all dark ages, those who seek to be what Plato called “evil lovers.” An evil lover weaves complex and fantastic lies and flattery, not to liberate those who listen, but to entrap them and to make them dependent on him for salvation. It is an indirect, stealthy way to gain power while claiming that all are equal. The “love” of the shepherd makes domesticated sheep of followers. Thus Nietzsche warns of the self-deprecating and humble who do not believe in man or happiness or the “triumphant affirmation” of the self.

By the logic of slave morality, merit becomes its own self-opposite. The ascetic who embraces suffering and nihilism, who marks his wealth in how much suffering he can endure, becomes the “show-piece” of man! The Hegelian cybernetic human is self-deluded and self-tormented by bad conscience, a “god in ruin.” According to Nietzsche, this sorry creature is now crawling with “maggots” while the new man, who has gained his little liberty at such great costs, is struggling to emerge.

The Virtual Model and “Right” Thinking

Nietzsche warns against the attempted reversal of the metaphysical hierarchy between the actual and the virtual. But it continues and is even heralded as a great step forward in networking, globalization, “connectivity,” and worldwide conformity. The great colonizers and teachers of self-hate today are propositional logic and commercial imagery. Logos and pathos have been “objectified” and are therefore free of pagan ethos. Questions of justice, valor, honor, courage, and prudence become impossible to open. We are, as Nietzsche points out,

ignominiously “beyond good and evil” and beyond meaning and value. We have become pathetically pragmatic, Spencerian. Only quantifiable materialism remains. The relationship between language, thought, and identity is fundamental (Isocrates, 1929; Sapir, 1949; Whorf, 1956; Merleau-Ponty, 1973; Hall, 1983). Japan is a good example. High quality and expensive products, even cosmetics, are sold using Caucasian models (Takagi, 1996; Yamada, 1997). Another example is the argument put forth by the first education minister of Japan during the Meiji Restoration, Arinori Mori. Being convinced that Spencerian social Darwinism was correct, Mori actively promoted the abandonment of *nihongo* (“our meager language”). Over one hundred years later this lack of self-confidence continued as Susumu Tonegawa, the 1987 Nobel Prize Winner in Medicine, told his Japanese countrymen during an address at MIT, “We should consider changing our thinking process in the field of science by trying to reason in English” (quoted in Postman, 1992: 124; Smith, 1998).

The point is clear, cultural homogenization; adaptive conformity is good, even sane. English should not only be the universal language of business, but the preferred language with which to think. Hence, the inferiority complex that drives one to abandon the very core of cultural identity, one’s native language. Why? Because it holds one back from being able to “think right,” to be “practical” and “useful,” the virtues that constitute the essence of Herbert Spencer’s conceptualization of the “good” (Nietzsche, *GM*, First Essay, Section 3). We see the same claims made against Black American English by those who falsely believe that what we call “standard American English” today was never seen as a bastardization of English in the past. Language changes, and attempts to “standardize” it once and for all, and to do so in the interest of “right thinking” constitute linguistic/cognitive fascism.

“Thinking right,” means thinking in simple and straightforward declarations of fact that distinguish clearly between definite and indefinite articulation (category/case distinction), and that lend themselves to propositional logic. Too much “fuzzy” ambiguity is an obstacle to systematic and efficient behavior (Ellul, 1964). But what may be perfectly clear to a native speaker because he or she is a “high context” communicator (deriving much of the meaning of a message from the context within which it appears) may be obfuscating to computers that epitomize the absolute in zero context “thinking.” The robot is the purest form of model minority. The robot has no identity in need of “disintegration” in order to adapt to the standard way of thinking and behaving (Gudykunst & Kim, 1997). With the drive to globalization, entire

cultures, ways of thinking and feeling, are made to feel inferior and guilty because they are not easily translated into symbolic logic for the purpose of computational ordination by "expert systems." Despite its claim to pure formal innocence, the idea of "model" presupposes criteria and instrumental purposes that are quite perspectival, narrow, hardly "disinterested," and that need to be exposed as such.

Rather than the thing coming before its re-presentation, now the virtual model acts as the criteria for evaluating the configuration of the actual.⁴ Ergo the etymological relationship between "virtue" and "virtual." Thus, the ethnocentric essence of "development," modernization/Westernization. Instrumental efficiency, right behaving and thinking, becomes the modern virtue, what Jacques Ellul (1964) has called the "cult of efficiency." The stress on efficiency to the neglect and even exclusion of other interests and virtues involves what Weber (1946) and Husserl (1970) call a radical truncation of human value, a reduction of the good to quantifiable performance criteria, ala Tayloristic surveillance and "scientific management." This drastic narrowing of the concept of value is hardly "disinterested" and "objective." Rather, this condition manifests what Gebser (1985) has called "hypertrophic perspectivism." This enables the Platonic rhetoric of defining when "progress" toward an ideal principle has been made, and when an actual contingent "problem" has been "corrected."⁵ The "other ideal world" threatens to enslave this one reducing it to perpetual performance evaluation, fear, and guilt.

Perpetual performance evaluation begins with the invention of conscience. This is when guilt becomes "irredeemable debt," when guilt cannot be "discharged," and penance becomes a permanent condition owing as it does to the unassailable infallibility of final judgment. Progress becomes, absurdly, a permanent condition. Thence is born the totalitarian idea of "eternal punishment," a "monstrous mode of valuation" (Nietzsche, *GM*, Third Essay, Section 11). When this occurs, as Jean Baudrillard (1983) argues, the ideal "simulation" has infiltrated, or achieved an ontological import, such that lying and or self-delusional fantasizing become the "actual" state of affairs. And one is compelled to take revenge against oneself.

Plato's Dream: Fantastic Guilt and Revenge

On one hand we might say that blacks have sunken into the masturbation of imaginary retribution, daydreaming about all the

malicious things they would like to do to the evil Euro Americans. On the other hand, the irredeemable guilt of Euro America for the successes of their ancestors, for the success that has made their privilege possible, is equally imaginable and masochistic. According to the culture of sadomasochism, fantasy revenge makes the ascetic feel good, and so it continues. The problem is that Christian *ressentiment* and guilt are self-justifying. It is taught that the asceticism of guilt builds an account of bad conscience, which is convoluted into being "good" according to Christian morality. The more guilty and self-hating one is for the past, the "better" they are as a person. The guiltless are truly evil. Hence, self-hate and self-torture become virtues, as is evinced by so many pious self-mutilators during the Dark Ages. It is what Nietzsche calls the "Herkles of duty." Punishment is not meant to "improve" but to sicken the soul. It "is supposed to possess the value of awakening the feeling of guilt in the guilty person" (Nietzsche, GM, Second Essay, Section 14). Punishment is the "*instrumentum* of that reaction called 'bad conscience'" (Nietzsche, GM, Second Essay, Section 14). Obedience is the goal and merit becomes a measure of how much weight of guilt, lowliness, and humility one can shoulder. This is the "bad air" of stinking lies.

"Bad conscience," once it takes root, becomes like a "polyp" eating into a person and spreading, leading to the final contradiction that the only way to save oneself is through the "duty" of "sacrifice" (Nietzsche, GM, Second Essay, Section 21). Such a contradiction is pure nihilism, the final nihilism of life against life. Such a "good" as self-hate is sickness as much as *ressentiment*. The ascetic ideal "springs from the protective instinct of a degenerating life" (Nietzsche, GM, Third Essay, Section 13). It is "priestly vengeance" turned against oneself. There have even been "epidemics" of this, of having "had enough" and being weary of life as in the dance of death around 1348 (Nietzsche, GM, Third Essay, Section 13). But ever the adversary of nihilism, Nietzsche argues that out of this sickness, this self-destructive "No," comes an "abundance of tender Yeses" which compels one to live (Nietzsche, GM, Third Essay, Section 13).

The Model Minority Aporia

The idea of the model minority is both. It is actual and virtual, mimetic and ideal, yes and no. And the two do not match. The model minority is a call to obedient mimicry but also a charge to make America "better" than what it actually is. Since the virtual aspect of the model minority is an expression of virtues, we must ask whose virtues it presents. The virtues of

the model minority, such as deference to authority, willingness to work hard, willingness to defer gratification, and being apolitical may not be the dream of the minority person. Instead, such criteria must be those of the mainstream "host" culture, "host" being a curious word choice of many intercultural, and a few "ethnic" studies writers, which implies that the weaker component, the "sojourner" who must adapt or fail, is a parasite. Model minority criteria must be the criteria of the host culture because a newcomer would hardly be in a position to define what is a "model minority" (unless that newcomer is a powerful conqueror or otherwise very wealthy, which means that they do not manifest minority status by definition)

The minority is not in a position to define him- or her, but to be defined. The "majority" is that person or group that has control of resources and can be the definer. In the United States, the values, expectations, beliefs, and interests manifested in the model minority ideal are the values, expectations and interests of mainstream Euro America. It must be added that many non-whites promote mainstream Euro American ideals, even sometimes when those ideals preclude them from attaining citizenship in its fullest sense. Such a self-contradicting posture, that involves the rejection of the self and its interests in favor of a dominating role model, is false-consciousness.

The interests, values, beliefs, and expectations, expressed by the virtual ideology of the model minority are often not identical with those of new immigrants or actual minorities. The two sets of values and interests may be more than merely different, they may even be in confrontation with each other, one being the interests of the exploiter and the other set those of the exploited. But like colonialism, exploitation is not unidirectional. Many people immigrate to the United States in the hope of exploiting opportunities there. As George Homans (1954) argues, human interests and the propensity to cooperate or compromise tend to have an exchangeability about it, a *quid pro quo* structure. Interests compete, sometimes overlap, and sometimes clash. So long as awareness is involved, interest, prejudice, in a word perspective, is also involved.

Double Consciousness and The Model Minority Quagmire

The model minority ideal presents a terrible quagmire for minority group members. This is so because the minority is taught that they are inferior to the majority. But yet if the minority sincerely wants to be valuable and respected, even if that means insisting, for instance, on being

shipped out to fight for a country that denies them the right to vote, they must act just like the majority. If the minority believes the majority assessment of their appearance and behaviors as being in need of modification, if the minority believes that they are inferior and if they truly want to fit in, then it is "rational" for them to mimic as closely as possible the example of appropriate and fitting appearance, beliefs, and behaviors as presented by the majority. The triumph of the model minority/adaptation ideology is evinced by double-consciousness. Double-consciousness means that the minority has internalized the values, beliefs, and attitudes of the majority perspective (Dubois, 1989). The horrible quagmire is that this then leads to seeing oneself through the eyes of the Other that the minority begins to "adapt" because they judge themselves by the standards imposed on them by the majority.

A good example of double-consciousness is the internalization of aesthetic ideals that can lead to self-hate among minorities. No one goes to a plastic surgeon and asks to be made to look more like a Black African, a Native American, or an Oriental; not even in Latin America or the Orient. Why? Because the majority version of beauty in the United States, which is becoming global, dominates the personal aesthetic of minorities whom, by definition, deviate from the ideal. Instead, African Americans attempt to straighten their hair, have their noses and lips made smaller, et cetera. Likewise, Orientals have an extra fold cut into their eyelids and get breast enlargements. Native Americans throughout Latin America have their faces made to look more Caucasoid.

Going under the knife clearly demonstrates a minority judgment of the self, based on majority standards that literally lead to an attempt to erase one's very face. This is a very physical manifestation of cultural adaptation described as being the willful "psychic disintegration" of one's identity followed by a "reintegration" as a new, "higher level" person (Dabrowski, 1968; Jourard, 1974; Gudykunst & Kim, 1997). There is also the much discussed color gradient among Asian Indians, Blacks and Latinos (McDaniel, 1995; Russell, et. al., 1992). Adaptation, as the cure for the "disease" (Adler, 1987) of culture "shock" (difference) "necessitates both acculturation (learning) and deculturation (unlearning)" (Gudykunst & Kim, 1997: 360). The cure is to unlearn one's self-identity in order to fix "personality maladjustment" (Lundstedt, 1963; Gudykunst & Kim, 1997: 358). This particular conceptualization of "adaptation" insists that one abandon one's indigenous clothing, housing, education, religion, business and political practices, family structure, and so forth in order to fit in. This cure is offered as the best, perhaps only way to be accepted. The solution

to anxiety and stress offered by intercultural adaptation theorists is the abandonment of the self for modern Western styles of thinking and behaving indeed abandoning one's dreams one's mind for the dreams of another. Languages, truths, logics, gods, communities, and identities, in short entire worlds are discredited as impractical, inefficient, and lost: willingly abandoned, which is the essential ideal of "adaptation" (Gudykunst & Kim, 1997; Also see Chapter 11 in this volume).

But then, instead of the presumed "satisfaction" that fitting in is supposed to achieve, diasporic agony of not being able to "go back" emerges. This is the essence of the post-colonial condition. As one Kiowa told this author, there is a profound sadness in having no "back there" anymore, of being "cut off" from any authentic past. Lost means extinct, not just misplaced, which implies the ability to recuperate, to undo, or revitalize. Astoundingly, according to William Gudykunst and Young Yun Kim, minorities should willingly, happily abandoned their worlds as a sign of "maturity," "open-mindedness," and "higher cognitive complexity" (Gudykunst & Kim, 1997; See also "Cultural Fusion and the Defense of Difference" in this volume)

As Karl Marx would predict, the majority (dominant) culture is self-justifying through academic theory. Cultural adaptation theory is very ethnocentric in that it argues that no matter what the ethnic/cultural majority happens to be, the rule of adaptation dictates that psychic and behavioral assimilation is the only hope for happiness, literally good mental health (Kim, 1988; Gudykunst & Kim, 1997: 351, 352). The weak individual must move in the direction of cential tendency toward the dominant culture or risk becoming mentally ill. Gudykunst and Kim (1997: 346-348) even designate what kind of personality traits are best for adaptation such as being "open," "resilient," and "flexible." Having a positive attitude contributes to successful adaptation too. By reverse logic, a multicultural milieu must be a miserable vortex of uncertainty and anxiety. Successful adaptation requires the internalization of beliefs and values that contradict previously held beliefs and values, thus leading to behavior modification. To conform is to gain conformation. Conformation is the recognition of the existence of the minority, as such, by the majority. The importation of majority, alien beliefs and values leads to behavioral, linguistic, and psychological conformity by means of the force of self-hate. Adaptation theory promotes hegemonic domination as good. Not just good for the majority, but as good for the minority. The essence of cultural adaptation theory is that erasing the self is good. It leads to satisfaction and mental health.

The quagmire that the model minority concept creates instantly shows itself when the majority rejects minority efforts to become majority members as "getting out of line" and not "knowing their proper place." Whites see the efforts of nonwhites to become white-like as both admirable and rational and at the same time as pathetic and weird (i.e., the endless ridicule of Michael Jackson's appearance). Of course, on this issue many whites too are marginalized, minoritized by the beauty myth (Wolf, 1991). Fake blondes abound. You cannot be too white or too modern or too "rational" or too "mentally healthy." But the truth is not so simple. It is not true that you cannot be too "in-group," no matter the group, as for instance when in Japan individuals who try too hard to be Japanese-like are thought to be very strange by Japanese natives who refer to such foreigners as *henna gaijin* (strange stranger). There are very real limits to acceptance through "disintegration-reintegration" and the limit varies according to the host environment, a long recognized truth among hermeneuticians, just realized in the mid-1990's by cultural conformist theorists.

This vanity is what I call phenocentrism. It is part of a larger pride called ethnocentrism. It has been called an illness. But it is an illness that should not be cured entirely, especially if that means the disintegration of the self, or the false proclamation that the Other (the White for instance) is not beautiful. Rather, it is an illness that needs to be cultivated among other groups, at least to the extent that they enjoy the warmth of a low-level fever, a sense of self-worth. Only according to the ignobility of slave morality is the prescriptive "cure" the denial of beauty and strength in the Other. The noble cure is not to deny the virtuous in others but to see it in one's self.

Slave Morality and the Persuasive Power of Humility

One of the triumphs of slave morality is found in this exploitation of humility and guilt to become king (literally in the case of the Christ figure and others like Hitler and Napoleon). According to Nietzsche, the truth is that practically everyone wants to be king, even the "king of kings," even if they don't admit it. Not admitting life's ambition is in fact dishonesty, a deceptive way to achieve dominance by claiming to be disinterested. The appeal to base origins is often just a dishonest ploy to attempt to achieve transcending power.

In the Twentieth Century this was evinced by the need of the political right and left alike, in democracy and totalitarianism, to evoke ignoble

origins, turning the ignoble into the righteous. Under the hegemony of *resentiment*, failure and poverty become badges of glory and courage. This last century was the first of the masses and so it is not surprising that leaders everywhere chant the mantra of ignoble origins that are noble from Bill Clinton to Hitler, from the Bulgarian Communist Gyorgy Dimitrov of Bulgaria, to the Catholic capitalist Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines. According to slave morality to be ignoble is noble, and thus one claims power by being obsequious and slipping in through the backdoor. It exploits the morality of *resentiment* toward those qualities that are truly noble and which the "humble" secretly covet. Such leaders take on the mantle of prestige and glory "reluctantly," as a "duty" to the "masses," perhaps even as a "sacrifice." But then, very often, they become permanent, even absolute powers. The responsibility is "heavy," but yet they cannot bring themselves to "abandon" their "flock." Perhaps they are masochistic. At any rate, the rhetoric of slave morality enables the "reluctant" king to bask in sympathy for being privileged. How glorious. Thus, humble leaders of slaves gain two kinds of admiration with one success. And the oppressed worship their oppressors.

This is rampant among those who seek to ascend to the absolute heights of admiration through ascetic purification, obsequiousness, and false humility. A prime example is clergy. The tactic is to win the competition of who can be the most self-hating, the most self-deprecating, and thus the highest, the most admired and loved. Slave morality wins by losing. Herein lies a masochistic and sadistic trap. For gaining sympathy and pity can make one weaker and weaker. But for those who would be saviors, they must first cultivate those who need salvation; they must first teach them that they need a savior. This is the oldest sales pitch in history. To be a leader one must first find downtrodden fellows and cultivate them as followers, by flattering them for being abused and therefore righteous. If they did not see themselves as downtrodden, then this can be remedied by relentless exposure of their "false consciousness" by truthsayers. Such "great teachers" will continually expose to the "downtrodden" their self-delusional ways, until they come to "realize" that they are being treated unfairly and so should seek out a savior.

This is a type of sophistry that Plato, in the *Phaedrus*, called the "evil lover." The evil lover is a speaker who does not want to liberate his or her audience. Instead the evil lover seeks through flattery, compassionate "understanding," and pity to make them dependent on herself for salvation, thus elevating herself by lowering them, by teaching them that they are weak: by making them into a herd of followers. Thus the message

makes an audience: a specific kind of audience. For while the strong turn away from such messages, by sheer process of elimination, those who stay to listen form the herd.

This trap embraces the denial of life. And for those lavishing pity onto the willingly weak, it teaches the winners, and even their descendents, to feel guilty for winning. Thus we have Euro American guilt and Black American willingness to be "righteous" former slaves, but slaves yet as Eldridge Cleaver, Malcolm X, Kwame Ture (formerly known as Stokely Carmichael), and Huey Newton (among others) have argued. This insistence on finding a righteous self-image by virtue of being the descendants of slaves is at the core of the Black-Jewish problem. It is a righteousness that comes with pity. This is why this author is very suspicious of Cornel West's call for "prophetic" leadership while also shunning Black national leadership and degrading the value of "race-effacing managerial leaders" (1993: 59). For it is West who sends the subtle but presumably important message of using the lower case "b" when writing "black" as an adjective for America, leadership, community, nationalism, intellectual, authenticity, and self. He claims to want to change the structural apparatus that hurts the Black community but downplays those who understand the machine and who can manipulate it. This may be momentarily inspirational, like many guides to personal improvement, but it is a counterproductive theological rhetoric.

No doubt, under earlier circumstances, Afro American theology was a vital source of survival for that community, but not a means of escaping pity. Survival is not a very challenging goal in Twenty-First Century America. Tony Brown (1995), who lectures not mere survival but a striving for relative power, articulates a more Nietzschean approach. Black American theology has been a generator of righteous indignation through self-pity. Teaching Blacks Christianity has been a great boon to Euro Americans. As Nietzsche pointed out, a religion that offers as its paragon of virtue a god that is willingly betrayed and murdered by its followers is not very noble. Nor is resurrection a great feat or a surprise given a divine being that already knows the future. There is something of a deception lurking here. Was god the father's anger an act, a bit of divine theater to convince the audience? Spiritualism is absolute politics.

While West (a theologian) preaches righteous indignation with the status of former slavery as a constant subtext, he is in fact acting out the idea of being a national leader, even a national moral teacher, while at the same time claiming that the Black American community must eschew the search for a new Messiah figure. This is quite confusing. His words and

deeds contradict each other. Brown (1995) and West do come together however, on a stronger note when they agree that the Black community needs to come to grips with "the structural and institutional processes that have disfigured, deformed, and devastated black America" (West, 1993: 69) But so long as Blacks like West continue to preach that, "blackness is understood to be the perennial possibility of white supremacist abuse," it will be. In fact, the continual reiteration of such a claim does two things. It keeps the need for salvation going (sells inspirational books and necessitates speaking tours), and abuses the Black community by keeping the focus on White behavior. As long as White guilt is kept center stage as the major Black concern, Black issues will be marginalized. Such discourse serves to maintain an interpretation that sells Messianic books. In mass markets salving messages sell

West's (1993: 43) definition of a "prophetic framework," that encourages moral assessment of the American situation, is a Platonic/Thomistic diversion, one that many Asian Americans are not saddled with. Moralizing is already over-determined; it has become an industry, an obstacle to "getting over." Pathos and Ethos need to be converted into action. After the Philippine community, which is very strong in Hawaii and fraught with problems of "patronage," The Korean American population is the most Christian among Asian Americans. Like Blacks, Koreans must guard against such diversions. Of all the former European colonies, wherever one finds a strong emphasis on Christian morality, such as Mexico or the Philippines, there one finds great suffering, physical and psychological poverty, high-power distance, and righteous, passionate indignation. Insofar as institutional reform comes only out of Euro American guilt and minority self-pity, it is not noble and the kind of White backlash and Black *ressentiment*, that we in fact see, will shadow it. Blacks who have prospered through affirmative action feel resentful for the help and robbed of their virtue, undervalued as undeserving. White's see affirmative action as pathetic and unfair, breeding anger and pity in the White community. Searching for a "prophetic vision" (which West is more than happy to offer at a price), has thus far failed to change the psychological and economic deformation of America.

Of Euro American guilt, here too a sort of backdoor righteousness lurks. Slave morality makes the victor feel guilty for winning. From the point-of-view of the slave, winning is "bad." Beyond this, slave morality teaches the noble to have only two emotions, guilt and pity, the two most ignoble of all emotions. Furthermore, guilt is not enough, for the winners

are encouraged to feel bad about not feeling bad enough, which is "good." The "good" emerges when a person says to him- or herself that they "know" that they should feel bad about the calamity of another but they just don't, which in turn proves that they are actually "deep down" a "good" person because they know that they should feel worse.

According to slave morality, it is better to be a slave than a master. Slave morality attempts to make the slave's condition into a great accomplishment. It is even better to choose to lose, for the "meek shall inherit the Earth." Herein is the transparent and totalitarian ambition of world domination but through the subversion of the noble, not through nobility itself: not through winning but through inheritance gained by groveling and merciful handouts. To give is better than to receive. Each time there is a perception that the White community is "giving" aid to the Black community, this breeds weakness and a bitter tasting gratitude among Blacks, and a sense of self-superiority, the validation of magnanimity known as the "White Man's burden."

Out of this soil grows not admiration and friendship among strong equals but envy and *ressentiment*. According to the slave morality, the noble should suffer not a temporary purgatory, but nothing less than eternal torment for following life and winning. This is the birth of the most monstrous virtue, eternal damnation. Here we have the frustration of guilty Whites being told that they are not guilty enough and need to pay more and more reparations. The monster that rises out of this fertile ground of mutual *ressentiment* is called "backlash." Backlash is a defensive posture. It is a sign of weakness. Ignobility becomes global. Self- and mutual respect fade further in the wake of "moral" judgment. The strong should be eaten alive by the righteous masses. For the weak this is the lesson of the condemnation of Socrates by those that could not withstand truth but instead hid behind one another in the mob voice. For them, the execution of Socrates is not a tragedy but a victory. Pagan criticism and questioning as to the existence of saviors and gods, the virtue of equality, and the exposure of pity as a false promise, is silenced.

Euro America is strewn with the spoiled descendants of conquerors, who seek to be "good" by being "appropriately guilty." Their conquering ancestors did not feel guilty for having triumphed against opponents that would be kings themselves if only they had been stronger. The spoiled descendants do not truly respect those who their forefathers defeated but only pity them. The truth is that nearly every group in history has proven itself to be very capable of extreme violence toward out-group members. To feel guilty about having prevailed in such a world presumes that one

has lost the sense of this truth.

Boundary Violation Avoidance

Boundary violation avoidance, which is a major attempt to safeguard identity and privilege, can be achieved by the majority by either setting criteria that are impossible to totally achieve, like becoming White, or by continually changing the criteria of the target the model minority is supposed to fix on and mimic. This is why dwelling on; fixating on White behavior is like following a carrot on a stick. It gets one nowhere, especially because, by definition, the stick is controlled by the majority. The moving target ploy serves two purposes. First it assures the integrity of the boundary between the majority and minority thus protecting their respective identities as such. And second, a moving target creates a continual motive for the model minority to keep driving to belong, to keep trying to conform; at least until frustration reaches a point I call the frustration threshold.

The frustration threshold occurs when a person gives up trying to accomplish goals, including those set by others. In this case trying to join a group that doesn't want you, that even defines itself by not being you so that if you finally accomplish membership, your very existence nullifies the exclusivity and therefore the allure of group membership. This is the quagmire of being a model minority. The moving target reveals a fear that once minorities assimilate they may relax and be less productive workers and even begin to assert political ambitions. That is, minority group members might begin to truly act like majority group members and may come to have a sense of ownership in the system and attempt to infuse their own agendas and styles into its form.

This is in fact exactly what tends to occur with successive generations of modern Asian immigrants. But it is not only the majorities that do not like to see this "going to seed" process occur. Minorities that have most strongly internalized the virtues of the ideal minority concept also dislike other minorities that deviate from that ideal. This constitutes the difference between the house and the field slave as defined by Malcolm X (1990; hooks, 1994). First wave immigrants tend to see successive generations as losing not only their own traditions, but also their drive; becoming lazy, spoiled and less ambitious, less "concerned." In short, first generation immigrants often see successive generations as becoming, in a derogatory sense, "Americanized." It may well be that recent Korean arrivals see Blacks this way and vice versa. Blacks tend to see Koreans as submissive

house slaves who like to be close to the master while Koreans tend to see Blacks as uncooperative field slaves. Why, because Koreans have been more willing to internalize Euro American beliefs and aspirations, to exploit the system. This points up the importance of understanding a person's motives for migrating, and under what condition their movement occurs, to understanding assimilation. The individual's horizon (embodied situatedness) cannot be ignored. Nor can the context. Banal generalizations can obstruct understanding as much or more than facilitate it.

Many Blacks see Koreans as naïve fools for believing that they can become White, while some Koreans demonstrate that by cooperating they in fact can become economically and educationally successful, which generates *ressentiment*, envy, and frustration among some Blacks. They are mutually alienated from each other. And both are wrong. By achieving educational and economic power, Korean Americans are hardly "house slaves." Also, African Americans have not only struggled to join the mainstream, they have even insisted on fulfilling their duty as full-fledged American citizens defending the United States during war, which is hardly a "field slave." Whether or not it is acknowledged, African Americans have helped to build the house that the new Korean immigrants live in. The continual struggle is over the architecture. The house is never finished. And now Korean stylistics are being added.

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NOTES

1. As Walter Kaufmann, the preeminent Nietzsche scholar in English points out, Nietzsche purposefully used the French spelling “*resenntiment*” because German lacks any close equivalent and also because he had just emerged from being under the influence of Wagner and was reacting against Wagner’s strong anti-French sentiment. Nietzsche saw himself as the “heir of the French moralists and as a ‘good European.’” (Kaufmann, 1967:5). Nietzsche was strongly against nationalism and he came to greatly distrust German thinking especially that of Hegel and Wagner, seeing in them the seeds of nationalistic madness.

2. It has been noted by Stanley Hubbard (Basel, 1958: 130) in his Nietzsche und Emerson that Nietzsche carefully studied the only Emerson available to him in German, Emerson’s *Essays (Versuche)* making copious notes in the margins. Also in Section 92 of The Gay Science, Nietzsche refers to Emerson along with Giacomo Leopardi, Prosper Merimee, and Walter Savage, as one of the four “masters of prose.” Of course Goethe is assumed. But the connection between Nietzsche and Emerson discovered in unpublished manuscripts (including some of his letters to his friend Franz Overbeck), by Walter Kaufmann and which is quite stunning relates to the fact that Nietzsche regarded Emerson as one of the very few worthy of study. Indeed, Nietzsche copied dozens of passages from Emerson into his notebooks. Nietzsche’s debt to Emerson is evident in the fact that Emerson referred to his method as the “joyous science” and himself as the “professor of the joyous science,” and he wrote of the “over man.” But even more

convincing are the amazing parallels between what Nietzsche said about Zarathustra and what Emerson had said about Zoroaster (the Greek name for the Persian prophet) In the last chapter to his book Nature, Emerson writes of the "poet that sang to me," and that "A man is a god in ruins" While being cautious of overstating the parallels, Kaufmann (1974: 10) wonders if the singing poet was not the inspiration for Thus Spoke Zarathustra.

3 Variations of the theory of adaptation and evolution can be found in ancient Chinese, Indian, and Greek literature. But its modern variant was developed by Hegel. Hegel's influence was eminent among the intellectuals and political elite of Europe. Darwin clearly was influenced by Hegel's ideas but it was Herbert Spencer who followed Hegel's nationalistic and racist tendencies most faithfully. Many in the field of communication who espouse one form or other of cultural adaptation theory of intercultural assimilation are not even aware that they are Neo-Hegelians or what that means in terms of conservatism. They have reanimated Spencer's dubious role in claiming to use social science to legitimize fascist policies like eugenics and survival of the fittest, which means conform or die. The theory of cultural adaptation and "intercultural transformation" are basically rewrites of 1960's social psychology theory that has since been largely abandoned in that field (Dabrowski, 1968; Jourard, 1974). The communication rewriters use euphemisms for the fittest like "most flexible," or "most open" to conformity, or most capable of "self-disintegration" and "reintegration" at a "higher level" of cognitive complexity (Gudykunst and Kim, 1997:362). When a minority disintegrates his or her identity and then reintegrates as a member of the host in-group he or she is then said to have attained a "higher level" of cognitive complexity and to have also attained "mental health." Those who do not conform are said to be mentally ill and immature (Gudykunst and Kim, 1997: 360-364; Kim, 1988; Kim, 1998). Nothing more ethnocentric could be imagined! Then they hasten to add self-contradicting repairs like being "mindful," generating a "third transcultural personality," and even claiming that this is "Zen." Double-consciousness is apparently not enough. Thankfully, most scholars in the more established social sciences are more mindful and can recognize Spencerian ideology when they see it, understand its implications, and avoid it. As might be expected, the greatest proponents of "cultural adaptation" are infamous for having rancorous relations with their nonwhite students in the classroom. And these are supposed to be the experts in intercultural communications!

4. This is essentially the difference between simulacrum and simulation which Husserl pointed out in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology and J. Baudrillard later popularized (1983)

5. The word "magic" is derived from an ancient Persian word, *mag(h)* borrowed by the Greeks. *Mag(h)* is also the root to the English words "might," "make," "machine," "mechanism," and so forth, indicating a common semantic dimension (see Gebser, 1985; Eliade, 1963; Giedion, 1964; Kramer, 1997).

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CONFLICT BETWEEN
AFRICAN AMERICAN AND
KOREAN AMERICAN**

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**University Press of America,® Inc.
Lanham · New York · Oxford**

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University Press of America,® Inc.**

4720 Boston Way
Lanham, Maryland 20706

12 Hid's Copse Rd.
Cumnor Hill, Oxford OX2 9JJ

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Printed in the United States of America

British Library Cataloging in Publication Information Available

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Socio-cultural conflict between African American and
Korean American / edited by Molefi Kete Asante, Eungjun Min.

p. cm

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Afro-Americans—Relations with Korean Americans. 2. Social
conflict—United States. 3. Culture conflict—United States.
4. United States—Race relations. 5. United States—Ethnic relations.
6. Afro-Americans—Social conditions. 7. Korean Americans—
Social conditions. 8. United States—Social conditions—1980- I. Asante,
Molefi K., 1942- II. Min. Eungjun, 1957-.

E185.615.S586 2000 305.8'00973—dc21 00-062915 CIP

ISBN 0-7618-1838-3 (cloth: alk. ppr.)



The paper used in this publication meets the minimum
requirements of American National Standard for Information
Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials,
ANSI Z39.48—1984