

## On the Sense of the "Partial" Fulfillment of Phenomenological Intuition

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A major problem for all metaphysical systems and their corresponding epistemologies, including methods, mediations, and pretensions at being certain, inextricably presume the issues of reliability and validity. For the perspectival modern mentality reliability and validity, or intersubjective agreement among experts, constitutes objective knowledge. Scientific discourse, which is the most powerful manifestation of the perspectival mentality, is a unique form of democratic communication. It is highly dualistic incorporating a dialectical structure including the use of "referees" in the competition between ideas.

An essential aspect of scientific as well as mundane truth claims is the necessity for duplication of findings and the shared presumption of what constitutes adequate evidence. Replication based on precisely shared theoretical formulations and procedures assures the reliability, and therefore the rhetorical—pragmatic power, of science as a method of discovery and an institution of change.

Due to an almost complete lack of replication, most so-called social "science" cannot properly be said to be reliable. For this reason, social scientific claims are perceived as being either not very convincing or, if believed to be true, to be little more than common sensical (trivially obvious). This may be why social "science" has failed as an institution of manipulation (social engineering) in the interest of alleviating suffering. While material engineers can build bridges that hold up, thus solving a commonly recognized problem, poverty, injustice, violence, and other commonly recognized "problems" for social engineers remain unsolved. Some might even wish to argue that social "science" often exacerbates these problems.

As Wilhelm Dilthey (1913) recognized, the power of the natural sciences is in their ability to:

subordinate [phenomena] to their constructions by bringing about uniformity among the phenomena that are to be ordered; this they do through abstraction, by means of these constructions. In contrast, the cultural sciences incorporate, primarily by taking the immeasurably expanding historical-social reality, as it is given only in its external manifestations or in effects or as mere product, the objectivated sediment of life...(in Habermas, 1971:338)

Since Dilthey drew this fundamental distinction "operationalization" as an attempt to reduce phenomena to uniform and measurable units has been embraced by many positivistic social scientists. However, operationalization (which means to operate upon an external reality) is only part of the discursive manipulation the discursive structure called "science" must do in order to exist and succeed. More important is the process of duplication which presumes this reductive uniformity of units.

Replication is essentially a communicative process whereby theoretical statements, concluding remarks, and procedural descriptions are shared and then reproduced. Agreement is managed via preconceived discursive formations that assure rhetorical effect. As is commonly observed for instance, statistics and numbers are

quite persuasive to many audiences. Reproduction however, has nothing to do with being "independent" as in the notion of independent (objective and value free) thinking, research, or inquiry. Quite the contrary, close referencing to previous research and networking with cliques of agreeable colleagues, act as very strict guides and prerequisites to the cumulative process of knowledge generation. But within this perspectival apparatus of knowledge production, a fundamental suspicion is highly valued and marks the modern distrust of "provisional" claims. For instance, if I claim to have accomplished "cold fusion" this claim does not constitute "knowledge" unless and until I have communicated with others who then duplicate the procedure and, in turn, communicate their success at copying my original experiment. The highest value is reserved for "independently verified knowledge." Corroboration under the burden of suspicion leads to a convinced audience of skeptics. This is widely believed to be the essential structure of scientific discourse.

Never the less, because not even one student of any field can have empirical, meaning *direct personal experience* of each major scientific experimental outcome, skepticism is actually grounded upon a strong faith in the authority of the discursive structure itself including of course its privileged metaphysic (what is *a priori* allowed to count as "real") and the halo of celebrated personalities. The issue of trust, which was honestly explored by the Hungarian chemist Michael Polyani (1958), is essential to scientific as well as mundane reliability. Modern mental rational science must rely upon prerational faith while it draws its power not from empirical observation, which alchemists and others proved to be very rigorous at, but from the abstracting and communicative process of replication and accumulation of findings (knowledge) which leads to generalizability across space and time (prediction). What constitutes a "fact" or "finding" is the discursive structure of this particular type of communication—what Dilthey called "construction." "Facts" are bits of information that have the privileged status of metaphysically authorized legitimacy. Facts are the result of intersubjective agreement about the mode of construction of definitions (operationalization). Under the auspices of this metaphysical dogma it is dictated that prior to encountering any phenomenon its definition must include how to spatialize (measure) it. Thus a belligerent ontological prejudice that exclusively favors the eye, is built into any acceptable mode of identification, discussion, and "knowledge." This prefabricated presumption about the metaphysical status of truth strongly prejudices what claims can and cannot count as "legitimate" knowledge. The metaphysical rules that are laid down prior to any investigation manifest the form and valued (acceptable) construction of "scientific," "objective," and so-called "value free" discourse. One of the essential and identifying qualities of "scientific" claims as such is their uniform reliance on spatial metaphysics. For any phenomenon to be a legitimate subject/object of study it must be measurable. ***If the ontological status of the phenomenon is such that it has no spatial extension, like an opinion or an attitude, then it must be redefined (metaphysically forced) in such a way that it can become measurable by definition (a priori).*** This is the metaphysical prejudice of positivistic constructivism which is rejected by Husserl. In the interest of validity, Husserl prefers to accept the phenomenon on its own grounds.

"Positivism" is a blatant valuation which implicates via contrast an epistemic negativism or nihilism. If meaningfulness means to be measurable, then existence by definition, shall be reduced to physicalism (spatial extension). However, and quite absurdly, while positivism was invented in the eighteenth century as an attempt to combat social and moral anarchy (evil nihilism) by making things manageable (reducing everything to a uniform metaphysical substrate available for division into consistent units of measurement), in the twentieth century it has embraced "value freedom" and an attitude of "disinterestedness." Mathematization has its own ideological agenda for the most basic form of politics is the process of defining what will count for reality. Who can argue with reality? What "is the case" has so much imperative force that it is often presumed to be "beyond question." This is the dictatorship of Reality. Scientific knowledge, which amounts to nothing other than a specific style of constructing and compiling claims about past observations (its application is more appropriately called "technology") relies upon trust. This is unavoidably the case for not every scientist can duplicate and personally vouch for the veracity of science as such. As Edmund Husserl (1913) demonstrated, the ultimate origin of all knowledge is subjective direct awareness. Thus, science depends on the communicative formation known as "testimony" which roots it in the life-world along with all other actions and disciplines such as history and philosophy (Campbell, 1776).

However, the logic of extrapolation can be followed in reminiscences (journal articles that report rationale, procedures, and findings) that are accepted as *being* valid. This form of acceptance, without direct personal experience, is faith. The privileged ontological status accorded to intersubjective agreement is essential to truth defined as consensus which presumes a type of competence and conformity of communication style which is often and erroneously called "pragmatic." To equate competence with conformity is hardly pragmatic especially if we accept the fact that change requires deviance and that humans are curious by nature (Kuhn, 1962). The "motors of change (history)" have always been actions that are not redundant (Krippendorf, 1975). "Leaders" whether in the arts or sciences are by definition not followers. What marks a "genius" is a distinct lack of conformity to old styles of thinking. Geniuses (a particular type of modern ego) are revolutionaries (Gadamer, 1960). But for leaders to exist there must be followers who presume a shared reality, a common semantic structure that allows them to comprehend and imitate. Competing realities compete by sharing a common rhetorical field. An essential aspect of this process of knowledge production is the standard which claims legitimacy as based on "adequate evidence."

Husserl (1913) more than any other thinker dared to confront the problem of the origin of knowledge as being direct personal experience. As Francis Bacon (1937) recognized in his outline of "idols" which lead to error, Husserl faced the dichotomy of absolute true knowledge versus permanently provisional supposition based on limitations inherent in the human condition. If it is true that the origin of all knowledge is direct personal (subjective) experience, and if all individuals are unavoidably limited by talent, intelligence, level of education, physical constraints, et cetera, then one cannot escape the conclusion that evidence for claims can only be "partial." However, partial awareness may be "adequate." This is so unless one ascribes to a notion of transcendental truth which exists in some sort of communal "mind" manifested as transpersonal knowledge like objective science.

Despite an appeal to transpersonal knowledge which may be characterized as a shared hermeneutic horizon, absolute knowledge remains beyond or inclusive of all possible horizons. Regardless of the number of samples compiled, logic dictates that simply collecting and averaging fundamentally limited perspectives cannot lead to truth. Adding error upon error can only lead to error. Therefore, the consensus theory of truth has been, by force of logic, rejected by Husserl as an adequate source of knowledge, adequate that is if one is seeking an apodictic ground for claims. This does not deny however the power of popular opinion. Indeed, much that passes for science is actually fad and fashion which drives publications and the granting of research money and position within the academic community.

However, for the intrepid inquirer, the problem remains, if all claims must be provisional or "partial," then what standards or criteria can distinguish between adequate and inadequate evidence? This epistemological problem remains cogent for it lurks behind all mediated/methodical claims to fact whether they be made in casual conversations, newspapers, law courts, or academic journals.

#### INTERSUBJECTIVE AGREEMENT AND ADEQUATE EVIDENCE

Husserl (1913) presumed a sense of "partiality" in his theorizing about direct experience (the only kind) which exposes a perspectival bias that segments reality into parts. According to standard (perspectival) semantic theory these parts are meaningfully grasped as oppositional. In this sense, part is ontically distinguished from whole, paradigm from syntagm, diachronic from synchronic, subjective partiality from objective totality, relativism from absolutism, secondary from primary qualities, et cetera. Likewise, "fulfillment" of intuition, meaning direct awareness, diacritically signifies emptiness. This logic belies the classical dichotomy of presence and absence which is transcended by the seemingly paradoxical ontic condition of a presentiated sense of absence.

Before continuing, it is important to clarify the difference between *gegenwartigung* and *vergegenwartigung*. Agreeing with Ludwig Landgrebe's (1981) distinction, the usual rendering of the two terms as "presentify" and "re-presentify" is rejected in favor of "presentiate" and "presentify" respectively. That is, *gegenwartigung* must be contrasted to *vergegenwartigung*. *Gegenwartigung*, or presentiating, designates the impressional phase (primal now) as different from the retentional and protentional phases (primal past and future) of the act of making something present (*gegenwartig*). Furthermore, presentiating is fundamentally different from representifying (*vergegenwartigung*). Presentiating is distinct from a second act of making something which is absent, present to consciousness, as with recollection and anticipation.

According to Landgrebe, the *ego cogito* manifests both acts simultaneously as when he writes, "in every present (*gegen-wart*) I know my life in both past and future" (quoted by Welton, 1981: 92). What is revealed here is an achronicity (an extrapolation from Jean Gebser's theory of the *achronon*) of the conditions of temporal constitution as being transcendental in the most radical sense of this term (Gebser, 1953). ***The synthetic ability to constitute flux into linear sense is itself neither "in" nor "out" of time, neither eternal nor finite in any spatial sense, but the very condition for the standing streaming of the ego cogito.***

To experience an absence is to always already presume a phenomenon that is not present. Absence expresses the sense of a loss and it simultaneously signifies a past present as a presentification and a present absence as a presentation. Thus absence proves to be temporally more complex than simple hypothetical linearity, hypothetical primal past. This state of affairs (absence) is different from the invisible which makes no such presumption—a "prior" knowledge. Invisibility here is not limited to the optical sensation of the spectral array that sighted people perceive, but rather it is being used in this paper as a metaphor for conscious awareness without metaphysical specification.

The invisible partakes only of presentation, that is the primal now. Partiality involves the invisible rather than the absent. That which is only partially fulfilled offers itself as a clue to the rest which is present *as invisible* like the bottom two thirds of an iceberg.

Before proceeding any further an unfortunate ambiguity in phenomenological literature must be confronted and clarified. Far too often authors have used intention and intuition interchangeably. There is even some of this in Husserl. For the purposes of this paper, intention designates the active aspect of consciousness. To discuss the relationship between intentionality and constitutionality requires another paper. Suffice it to say that intentionality is the drawing of the correlation between the noetic and noematic polarity. This is in line with Franz Brentano's (1907) original conception of intentionality and this description also accepts the Husserlian model of the correlational structure of experience.

Additionally, intuition in this paper may be sensuous or categorial. The relationship between intention and intuition (including sensuous) is not always clear in phenomenological literature. Often one (intuition) is conceived as being or not being "filled" by intention. However the literature often speaks of "partial" or "full" or "empty" intentionality as well. In this paper, intention is generally conceived of as being either fulfilling or not fulfilling only in relation to an intuitional correlate. The determination is made by degrees of expectation fulfilled. What is given is compared to projected expectation. Such comparison may be just as passive as passive constitutionality. When this occurs we say that we have been completely surprised by the given.

We now continue our investigation of the sense of partiality. Partially fulfilled intuition implies referentiality, and a whole that is fully given via the mutual implication of its partial appearance. It has the sense of a potential about it, a potential wholeness that may be suspected or sensed with certainty, i.e., I am certain that there is more to this phenomenon (that is wholly presumed) than "meets the eye." The idea of partial fulfillment expresses the ontic requirement for experience as dualistically perspectival, what Hans-Georg Gadamer (1960) calls "prejudice." Without a perspective (prejudice), experience can have no meaning—there can be no experience—no integration of new information. The meant of experience is the consequence of a particular "point-of-view."

Partial fulfillment implies the potential that through moving bodily or through free-variant imagination, the whole can be sensed in coincidence with some intuited identity that transcends contingency. Once sensed, the whole can be named as an identity across the diversity of noemata. All naming is a

transcendental process that unifies all possible adumbrations, including those only hinted at through implication, into an identity.

The transcendental constitution of a whole with the sense of potential is a necessary pre-condition for movement and free-variant thinking. Intentional acts can be guided by intuitional sense which, at least in the *Logical Investigations*, are presented as always already categorial (*anschauung*). Furthermore, the sense of intentional fulfillment being only partially realized is itself fully available as a sense of being partially/potentially whole. Thus one can speak of a **fully intended partiality without contradiction**. In other words, that I sense that thus and so is only partially given is itself self-evident. Partial fulfillment is itself reducible to a category of experience. The most basic faith of inquiry is that there is something to be discovered that has not yet been experienced and this "something" is not limited to any metaphysical prejudice, it may be a new geometry or a new star. Thus we can say that not only is there an intuition of partiality and potentiality but that these phenomena are presumed by inquiry and curiosity.

#### THE SPATIAL PREDICATES OF EVIDENCE

This short phenomenology of partiality reveals the presumption of a metaphysic. The spatial metaphors of "full," "partial," and "empty," that are used to predicate intuition betray a metaphysical prejudice in Husserl. This choice of wording reveals Husserl's modernity. But more than this, it also reveals that he did not succeed in escaping the influence of Descartes' metaphysics of referentiality and coincidence. This is evident here as well as in the separation of the immanent from the transcendent and the noetic from the noematic. What is clear here is that Husserl is insisting that the field of transcendental experience (categorial intuition as compared with sensuous intuition) is correlated with the world and that neither is fully intended but always mutually implicated. Act-consciousness always implies the consciousness of horizons.

Despite Husserl's repeated insistence that categorial intuition and sensuous intuition are always given together, and that intentional acts are always directionally copresent with the noematic "object," he fails to satisfy the question concerning the metaphysical appropriateness of spatializing metaphors such as "directed toward" and "empty signification."

The consciousness of the world as the "total horizon" is always presentiated but never impressionally presentified because transcendental consciousness and its correlate world horizon are not limited to any metaphysical imperative. However, the issue of correlation brings us directly back to the problem of partiality and fullness. If consciousness and world are always given together, then how do we recognize them as different? In what way do these words "consciousness of" and "world" have any meaning if not as different from each other. Although the Husserlian construct of noema and noesis is presented as a polarity the demands of active consciousness and passive phenomenon seems to pose a duality in order for its most basic theoretical components to make sense. To be sure, the Husserlian duality (qua polarity) is said to be necessary for the appearance of either side of the Cartesian split. The noetic-noematic structure is a necessary condition for the possibility of experiencing either the subject or the object. But the polarity becomes more distinct when partiality of intuition is the issue. Partiality suggests that the noematic "content" is separate from and progressively revealed by the "scanning

ray" (noetic act) of intentional consciousness as an active perspectival observer (Husserl, 1913).

Husserl claims to articulate a level of constitutionality that transcends all possible metaphysical positions while belonging to none. Yet, consciousness is revealed as a consciousness *of* because intuition is not always fulfilled. But how can we know when this is the case, and therefore, how can consciousness be theorized as *somehow* separate from the world it is of? ***If all that is given is what is given, then how could one know that what is given is only partial unless the whole is also given, thus enabling comparison?***

Husserl's claim that the experience of any contingent thing manifests a clue to its identity given as categorial intuition once again suggests a separation, a lack of identity between the sensuous and the categorial which seems to be determined, ontologically. There is an essential difference between the sensuous and the categorial. Their respective modes of appearing seem self-evidently given as essentially different.

#### The Fully Given Invisible

Partial intentionality can be adequately thematized only as a fully given phenomenon. But it is a phenomenon that has the essential sense of potential and anticipation about it. But anticipation of what? That which is hypothesized to be necessary for absolute intentional correlation with full intuition? The rest? My emphatic answer is yes! "The rest" is a fully given sense which means something present as invisible and it is precisely this nonempirical field of the unknown that enables, or is the precondition for, all exploration. For instance, empiricism (and in fact all modes of inquiry regardless of metaphysical prejudice) must presume the nonempirical in order to make sense and to be "exploratory," "satisfying," and "*fulfilling*."

How is this field of the invisible present? The "rest" is presentiated via implication. The intuition of "the rest" is *not* partially fulfilled but *fully given*. Obviously, to claim to have only partially fulfilling intentionality of something presumes to know what absolutely fulfilling intentionality means. Husserl's claims about empty and partial intuition seem to presume the Cartesian/Kantian quagmire of hypothetical postulation without the relatively simplistic metaphysical distinction between the subject and the object. Husserl's duality is more logical than metaphysical. Nevertheless, partiality is a spatial metaphor that may be inappropriate as a predicate to intention or intuition because intentionality is always already fully given. It is only intuition that may be given with the sense of some degree of emptiness. Because of this, to speak of degrees of givenness also betrays a numeric/spatial mentality.

#### Hypothetical Thinking and Anticipation

It is at this juncture that the key to Husserl's partial success at breaking away from the earlier dualisms of Descartes and Kant can be grasped. For what we are exploring here is nothing less than the essential nature of hypothetical experience itself. It is the essence of the phenomenon of hypothetical experience itself to have the sense of anticipation and partiality. If we remain true to phenomenology's radical antimetaphysical charge, then we must admit the sense of the partial as a fully given experience. Phenomenology, in other words, does not deny the

experience of hypothetical thought. Indeed, because only phenomenology rigorously guards against unquestioned metaphysical presumptions, only it can explore the essential quality of hypothetical experience. The irony is that although phenomenology does not rely on hypothetical statements, the "empirical sciences" do. This is why phenomenology is logically consistent while empiricism is absurd.

Likewise, the experience of potential, anticipation, and suspicion are fully given. They completely betray the essential nature of hypothetical conjecture. Thus hypothetical predication is fully given. If intention were only partially given one could not know it because the existence of the unconscious is not acceptable to phenomenology's rejection of hypothetical speculation as having any truth value. However, we can explore the phenomenon of hypothetical speculation while the empiricist who depends on it cannot.

### Hypothetical Experience

Partiality always implicates the invisible present—the whole predicated with the sense of potential and hypothesis. Furthermore, the name "hypothetical" given to a certain kind of experience presupposes a manifold of characteristics that are wholly and essentially presupposed and identified as such. The intention of partiality and hypothesis is thus totally exposed, and made available for analysis. The issue of exposure, that is the need for a methodical process called phenomenology itself, demonstrates that what is given is not already transparent or totally given. The requirement of assuming an unnatural attitude in order to expose metaphysical prejudice betrays the invisibility of "passive" constitution. Passive constitution, as well as active constitution, is similar to various degrees of intentionality. The very sense of the passivity that qualifies some experience cannot be appreciated until it is revealed by reflexive effort and then only by contrast to the sense or quality of active consciousness.

But we are not out of the woods yet. For the Husserl of the *Logical Investigations*, a type of Cartesian dichotomy between intuition and intention betrays a metaphysical mentality present in this work. Furthermore, the referentiality presupposed by intentional acts also betrays a latent dualism and spatial metaphysic. As Husserl clearly insists, meaning must be kept separate from perception.

If we may trust our arguments, we must not only draw a general distinction between the perceptual and the significant element in the statement of perception; we must also locate no part of the meaning in the percept itself. The percept, which presents the object, and the statement which, by way of the judgement (or by the thought–act inwoven into the unity of the judgement) thinks and expresses it, must be rigorously kept apart, even though, in the case of the perceptual judgement now being considered, they stand to each other in the most intimate relation of mutual coincidence, or in the unity of fulfillment (Husserl, 1900/1970: 685).

This separation is stressed repeatedly by Husserl as when he discusses intentional essence as the reference pointed to by mutually belonging percepts actively realized as the "this–meaning" of the object. Perception only realizes the possibility of an unfolding of the act of this–meaning with its "definite relation to the object" (684), while the meaning is not thus constituted, "nor even part of it" (684).



This "definite relation" begs the question and implicates the separation between the intuitional essence and intentional contingencies. The relationship is not merely "coincidental" as in the sense of being accidental or purely arbitrary however, for "perception is an act which determines, but does not embody meaning" (684). Perception only fulfills intuition but is not identical with it for this would mean committing a category error by confusing the two categories of absolute and contingent experience. Thus a photograph of a car can mean the same car as the one I am now sitting in while I hold the photo. This is obviously prior to, or transcendent to any ontifying act in the form of methodology or natural attitude.

This also begs the issue that lies at the heart of hermeneutics. Can one have an absolutely meaningless percept? We know that Gadamer's answer is an unequivocal no. Gadamer argues for the inevitability of perspectivity, that all perception always already manifests a unique perspective and that it is perspective that *enables* passive constitution to occur. So, for instance, the notion of an objective fact that harbors no prejudice is literally nonsensical. But perspective always already implies that more lies outside of the horizontal boundaries. It is this sense of the implicated as invisible far shore (that which is beyond the horizon and also defines the horizon as a horizon) that motivates exploration. But each exploration itself is marked with the style of the perspective that initiates it. Thus openness is enabled but in a particular way and indeed, without a starting point the journey cannot commence. The starting point is both necessary for the journey of exploration and prejudices the exploration. Thus blind and enabling prejudices depend on each other for sense: they are coconstituting. For Gebser, the causal priority of the constitution of perspective or perspectival constitution is a problem only for the spatializing and fragmenting modern mentality.

The problem of partially fulfilled intuition is an issue Landgrebe blames on Husserl's Platonism most emphatically expressed by his *Logical Investigations*. While Locke's tablet was pre-predicatively and pre-intentionally smooth, Husserl's is formatted with intuitional structures that prejudice intentional experience. To be sure, Husserl's metaphysics is not materialistic, but it is linear/spatial—structural. Husserl's position belies the presumed separation of the contingent and the essential which is carried fully into the paradigm that posits theory as that which explains contingent cases. This is in turn confounded by the problem of evidence which forces theory itself to be constituted as always contingent/provisional, at the mercy of future explorations. Thus, like a teacher whose student outgrows him, the theory that constitutes what evidence is "appropriate" can be changed by the force of the evidence. This is essentially the process of dialectical hermeneutics (dialogicality).

It is here in this relatively early effort that Husserl concerns himself with the dichotomy between the ideal logical conception and perception. At this stage in Husserl's thought the well known ambiguity of apodictic and adequate evidence circumscribes the problem of partially fulfilled intuition. For the Husserl of the *Logical Investigations*, only apodictic evidence was adequate. However, as the problem of partiality was revealed in a new way via his kinaesthetic investigations and more complexly his response to Wilhelm Dilthey's historicism and Heidegger's ontology, this issue of partiality took on a distinctly existential, that is to say, *essentially* existential sense. The essentially and necessarily perspectival nature of not only the kinaesthetic co-constitutionality of self and world horizon but also

linear time reveals the fundamental aspect of motive as being a search for additional evidence. Motive and the teleological nature of linear time as goal oriented (to be fulfilled) reveals Husserl's profoundly Western and modern (perspectival) prejudice.

#### THE ACHRONONIC (INVISIBLE) SOURCE OF TIME

However, Husserl's faithful modernity contains within itself a nascent post-modernity, for Husserl's revelation of the nature of transcendental ego, world horizon, and all fulfillments proves to be always "ahead," having the sense of always-already-but-only-potential. One is in short, motivated by the teleological sense of evidence that ideally can be apodictically and completely presentiated or fully intuited, but which always remains essentially ahead—essentially partial, essentially presentifiable rather than presentiatable. The profound consequence of this realization is the claim that everything that exists for the consciousness of... is always in the primordial future. Yet this presentification is presentiated as a *currently constituted*, essential sense-condition of the world. The sense of partiality is therefore a function of time spatially expressed via Husserl's Western linear conceptualization of living retention, living present, living protention. Meanwhile, the transcendental source defies diaphaneity by remaining also always "ahead," or to play on Fichte's analogy of the "red handedness" of the invisible center of the world horizon, the source proves to be an artful dodger. Thus Husserl and Heidegger prove to be well ahead of Derrida's deconstructive tracing of traces.

Furthermore, the invisible yet ever-present center of the world horizon including the streaming quality of it, is posited by Husserl as achrononic. The transcendental is itself neither in nor out of time. A gross analogy to the mediative aspect of consciousness is that computer memory banks retain information but are themselves not of the same order as that which is "saved" (presentified). Of course where this analogy breaks down is with regards to the self-constitutive aspect of consciousness.

***The point to be made however, is that the transcendental conditions for the existence of a coherent stream of awareness, which expresses temporality, is not itself a temporal phenomenon (it is transcendentally achrononic).*** It is the ever-present origin that defies presentiation and presentification. It cannot be caught red-handed, and it is this quality, which defies modern modes of thinking, that makes Husserl's transcendental far more radical than Heidegger or Derrida's linear temporics of trace and reductive lingualism.

But yet another problem immediately shows itself here. What does "being caught red-handed mean?" The invisible center of the world horizon, the transcendental ego is presentiated. Indeed, it is unavoidable. In order to appreciate Husserl's radicality we must understand that civilizational expressions (to use Gebser's terminology) are not merely traces of consciousness. Nor are they clues. Both "traces" and "clues," if interpreted from the attitude of the natural world, suggest a linear metaphysic, a linear temporics. But, the point here is that consciousness is *always already "caught red-handed" as implication*. "Grasping" consciousness is a futile effort only if one is assuming a spatial metaphysic that posits a fixed (synchronized) time that identifies existence (knowledge/truth) with physical extension—"thingness." But if this metaphysical prejudice is bracketed, as Husserl did, then consciousness as a process of implication and precondition for the identity

or sense of all phenomena (spatially extended and not) is not only "graspable" but unavoidable.

Consciousness is fully given and cannot be avoided because it is given through and with the immediate sense of trace and clue. Consciousness is not like the deer's hoof that left a print seven hours ago. It is not permanent in the sense of a physical thing, but is permanent as the precondition for any physical thing as such.

Clearly what is presumed by those who deny the existence of awareness is linear, spatialized time. By contrast, Husserl's choice of the word "clue" (and the now fashionable "trace") partakes in the metaphysical language of imprinting. According to this metaphysical notion ("clue"), that which leaves a clue is no longer present, and cannot be "caught," but only surmised. Yet, consciousness of the clue or the trace, and its temporal constitution as trace and clue is ever-present—unavoidably so. Consciousness does not need to be "caught," or "apprehended," or "grasped" for it is never absent. Its very presence has the sense of transcendental condition for... Our over-dependence on the phrase "consciousness of..." seems to have led us into a metaphysical habit of thinking in terms of object-things.

The appearance of consciousness is ever-present as the transcendental conditions for clues and traces; for permanence and flux. Consciousness is achrononic "processing," not thing. Likewise, perception is much more than simple "stimulus" which is a figment of the analytic (fragmenting) imagination. In the case of consciousness as well as perception, there is no-*thing* to be caught! In fact, the act of catching must be constituted by the very process it desires to hunt down. It is as if the hunter who is stalking the lion is riding on the lion's back and doesn't know it. No matter how the hunter tries he cannot find the lion, but his very trying is dependent on his feline mount. What enables our investigation of consciousness of... is being conscious.

The motive to seek further adumbrations, a distinctly perspectival sense of partial existence, is always experienced as a future project with an ideal goal of fully correlated (if not identical) intention with intuition. But it is the very and essential slippage of flux which outruns any such accomplishment as a once and for all fixation so that the issue of partiality remains as a paradoxically permanent aspect of human existence. The permanent quality is better expressed as being originary which does not partake of any temporal sensibility such as expressed by the term "permanent." Hence, the Aristotelian conviction in favor of probability—rhetoric.<sup>10</sup>

This is precisely where Heidegger and Derrida misinterpret Husserl's transcendentalism. Granted, the ancient word is perhaps an unfortunate choice, however, the point is that to be transcendental does not mean to be eternally permanent but to be the source of time itself. Flux is not the problem but a

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<sup>10</sup> It must be recalled that while empiricist "scientists" often claim Aristotle as their champion against Platonic idealism, Aristotle maintained the position that science/art/philosophy are essentially different from rhetoric because they make true claims derived from infallible premises (syllogistic reasoning). By essential contrast, Aristotle argued that any claim that relies on enthymematic probability is by definition rhetoric. Therefore, Aristotle would define what passes for statistical "science" today as mere rhetoric. Furthermore, the modern empiricist is self-contradicting because she must deny the existence of both inductive and deductive modes of thinking because neither form of reasoning is an empirical thing.

consequence. Achronicity is the answer. It is unavoidable. It is not the tracing of traces but the very precondition for tracing. Flux appears to be a problem only when we are obsessed with fixation.

We are always faced with perpetual beginnings. The idea of identity, as the perfect correlation of intuition and intention turns out to be always already complex. This is the source of the complexity of perception as compared with the hypothetical simplicity of stimuli.

#### INTEGRALITY AND THE PROBLEM OF ONTIFIED TIME

The very foundational conditions for apodictic knowledge proves to be so slippery that Husserl must abandon the identity of apodicticity and settle for the epistemic standard of "adequacy." And yet, he was often depressed because he apparently failed to understand the full import of his work. For he did achieve apodictic knowledge concerning identity and adequacy. The distinction between the two, reveals the problem of partiality as the very problem of ontified time. That which is never fully given remains ahead of all efforts to naturally ontify (presentify) them.

In other words, Husserl was disappointed not by his failure but by the fact that his own natural attitude prevented him from appreciating the full consequence of what he had achieved. Thus the streaming nature of being-in-the-world, nay of the world as mine, demonstrates the essentially partial, that is perspectively existential, sense of transcendental consciousness and its correlate the total world horizon. Neither is given as a monolithic ground. Ground turns out to be both indubitable and ungraspable in the natural sense. Husserl brought us to the very brink of an entirely new attitude—the integral.

World horizon and transcendental consciousness of "it" are mutually implicated. Likewise, past, present, and future are mutually implicated so that partiality always presupposes the whole. *The condition for implicate sensing may be named transcendental consciousnessing.* Recall that naming was earlier defined as a transcendental process. Thus, what is being stated here is a highly self-reflexive process of constitutional identifying.

Anticipation and retention as partial fulfillments lead to expectation as a temporal expression of motive. Expectation of what is not present, is future oriented but yet based on retention. The mutual implication of the two senses have expectation as their present nexus. For instance, I expect "X" to occur on the basis of past experience. This is essentially rooted in the perspectival/existential personal kinaesthetic awareness of spatial movement perceived as time. Although the adumbration of free-variant imagination can also demonstrate identity through difference, it lacks the same temporic quality as kinaesthetic constitution because it is not essentially spatial.

The space/time continuum is an abbreviated version of the modern Western spatialized sense of time. Because it is spatial, the modern sense of time leads to perspectival fragmentation into a corpuscular agglomeration of moments. The primary consequence of the monadism of kinaesthetic physicalism is partiality. This is the essence of the metaphysical prejudice that Husserl failed to escape. He failed because he did not fully expose and explore *the relationship between* space and time which defines the predominant metaphysical prejudice of the modern world. The only way to do this, as Gebser demonstrates, is to see time through

space and vice versa. Even here, the concept of "through" fails to bring to appreciation the idea of diaphaneity which Gebser attempts to illustrate.

What must be presentiated is the transcendental, as the achrononic and aspatial condition for space and time. For the modern, this tandem of space and time is co-constituting. To presentiate the transcendental, however does not mean that we must launch a safari. Rather, we only need to appreciate the necessary conditions for the process of implicate experience itself (co-constituting).

Another point that must be remembered, is that the transcendental origin of the constitution/integration of all perspectives reveals them to have the sense of being adumbrations. Adumbration means partiality which implicates wholeness, present as an invisible sense of moving horizon. When I spatially turn around, I expect to see "the rest" (the other part) of the room which is expected to be there "at rest," with duration if not permanence waiting to be discovered and rediscovered. Rediscovery, which presumes duration, is the necessary condition for reliable "knowledge." As adumbrations coalesce into identity which transcends contingent direct "personal" (empirical—for that epistemological prejudice) "observations," the phenomenon is given as intention. It is "prior" to adumbrations that slip into the past which is what I do not and cannot now spatially see. As I turn, what was before my eyes is now presumably behind. I am motivated to move in order to achieve the coalescence of identity. It is the perception of the whole as identity, that I expect to behold and this expectation motivates me.

A simple sequence of discrete (unrelated) stimuli cannot, by definition, constitute perception as such. Curiosity may be essentially understood as an active pursuit of further partialities/adumbrations with ideal intention fixed as expectation—a position that may well be thwarted thus supporting the idea that perception "determines but does not embody meaning" (684).

Partiality presented as adumbration essentially demonstrates the always alreadiness of internal-time consciousness as slippery adumbrations and imaginative variations passively and actively constituted into perception.

The reason Husserl abandons apodicticity for adequacy is because he demonstrates that the givenness of identity is also always slipping or fluxing. But he apparently failed to realize that this fact is itself apodictically given even though it is not "fixed" in the sense of the natural attitude. The awareness of the slippage is itself slipping in so far as it is presentified as a phenomenon itself, for the correlate to this experience of flux. The consciousness of flux, is itself always ahead. The identity of consciousness of... and the "object" is precisely what ancient Taoists wished to reveal with their question "what is blowing, the wind or my awareness of the wind." The origin remains pre-ontified, nontemporalized, nonspatialized. "It" cannot be located spatially or temporally but, diaphaneously, it is inescapable.

The paradox here is that the slippage can be conceived of essentially. It is a permanent condition which is constituted as slippery and directional. From this realization, one can begin to build back from the merely adequate sense of partiality toward the sense of apodictic fulfillment.

Experience is essentially partial. This new way to the transcendental field (along with the positive doubt back to the *ego cogito* and the bracketing of the natural thesis) is to grasp the flux as a permanent condition for the appearance of all phenomena. Essentially, all phenomena are temporal, that is fluxing including the

artful dodger, the transcendental ego. Fluxing is the fundamental predicate to the transcendental experience. "It" constitutes the "clues" and "traces," and so it is ever-present as the invisible requisite to visibility.

#### IDENTITY AND SYNTHESIS

Rather than battling time in order to render a timeless truth, Husserl brings us to appreciate flux as constituted and constituting, just as Gadamer champions prejudice as a necessary condition for experience. Prejudice as a categorial origin should not be mistaken for contingent/temporal prejudices. Likewise, the *ego cogito* remains invisible yet indubitable. Because he missed the radicality of the achrononic quality of the *ego cogito* Jean-Paul Sartre (1956) confused the invisible with nothing.

Rather than enumerating adumbrations as monadic perspectives and lamenting partiality as only enthymematic "degrees of truth," the essential fact of truth is that it is inescapably given as a partial intuition which presupposes a wholeness that is made present through reflection on the essential condition of the intuition of partiality as a universal category of experience. To speak of adumbration(s) in the plural is to fall into the trap of ontification and naturalization. Such expressions reveal the modern propensity to spatialize (existentialize) time as a series of discrete events that must then somehow be synthesized into an identity. Rather, it is suggested here that the fulfillment of identity is systatically co-constituted with the sense of partiality. To speak of an essentially perspectival quality of experience is to implicate a nonpartial sense of world horizon. The sense of the whole as background, is inextricably implicated with the sense of the partial as foreground. One does not make sense of one without the other. Text and context are co-determining just as movement implicates the horizon as an always present yet changing "boundary." Thus the whole truth is about permanent potentiality, essential contingency, and what is revealed is an apodictic certainty about the mere adequacy of presently "held" evidence.

For science, the appreciation of the essential provisionality of evidence as partiality is the temporic precondition for curiosity, discovery, motive, and life. The foundation of science and life alike is the achrononic/aspatial preontified conditions for time and space.

Insofar as Husserl and Gebser have demonstrated that science is of this world and not about it, scientific certainty (which has been deemed worthy of discussion by practically all of the great theoretical thinkers of modernity from Bacon to Wittgenstein to Quine to Derrida) its meaning for the world ironically presupposes a provisional status as the necessary condition for knowledge. Scientific knowledge which presumes nothing more than probability is according to Aristotle, mere rhetoric. It is persuasive, authoritative, and powerful. ★

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